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Abstract 
This report aims to identify, explain and detail the links and interactions in southern and eastern 
Mediterranean countries (SEMCs) between energy supply and demand and socio-economic 
development, as well as the potential role of energy supply and demand policies on both. Another 
related aim is to identify and analyse, in a quantitative and qualitative way, the changing role of 
energy (both demand and supply) in southern Mediterranean economies, focusing on its positive and 
negative impact on socio-economic development. 
This report investigates in particular:  
o The most important channels through which resource wealth can contribute to or hamper 
economic and social development in the analysed region;  
o Mechanisms and channels of relations between energy supply and demand policies and 
economic and social development. 
The burdens of energy subsidies and ‘oil syndrome’ are of particular relevance for the region. An 
integrated socio-economic development and energy policy scenario approach showing the potential 
benefits and synergies within countries and the region is developed in the final part of the report.
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Executive Summary 
Despite relatively strong economic growth in recent years, the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
countries (SEMCs) face a range of pressing socio-economic challenges, such as poverty, large 
structural unemployment and rapid demographic growth. Energy is an essential commodity that 
enables socio-economic development. However, the current energy situation in the region is 
characterised by a rapid increase in energy demand, low energy efficiency and low domestic energy 
prices due to extensive universal consumption subsidy schemes. In short, the current energy policies 
do not appear to be sustainable and pose several risks to the prospects of socio-economic development 
of the region.  
Patterns of energy supply and consumption in SEMCs strongly affect main macro-economic 
parameters, including fiscal balances and poverty trends. Volatility of global energy commodity prices 
and their relatively high levels in recent years constitute a burden on the finances of many net 
importing countries, both at the government level (via costs of running universal consumption 
subsidies) and the utility level. This also affects energy exporting countries. Furthermore, urbanisation, 
rapid population growth and economic growth all add to rising energy demand and put pressure on 
existing infrastructure, necessitating large new investments.  
Excessive energy bills lead to energy poverty and harm living standards and socio-economic 
development. As for other commodities (e.g. food, water), SEMCs’ governments use universal 
energy consumption subsidies to mitigate energy poverty. However, such price subsidy schemes 
appear to be quite inefficient at addressing poverty because on average only 20% of all energy 
subsidies (and 8% of fossil fuel subsidies) go to the poor, while most benefits profit the wealthy 
groups who consume more energy. Also, the subsidy schemes place heavy burdens on SEMCs state 
budgets, especially since the 2007-08 oil price surge that led to energy subsidies further increasing 
their share in total government expenditure. This growing pressure on state budgets appears to be 
unsustainable, in particular in Egypt, Lebanon and Syria (where subsidies account for more than 15% 
of total budgetary expenses). Furthermore, by distorting price signals, universal price subsidies act as a 
strong disincentive to a more rational and efficient use of energy and investment in the energy sector, 
including in renewable energy. 
The energy sectors in SEMCs, especially in those exporting oil and gas, make up a large share of the 
economic activity and public finances. Nonetheless, certain market structure features and modes of 
energy sector operation lead to significant negative externalities, and can burden the whole economy. 
Large hydrocarbon revenues in two SEMCs (Algeria, Libya) account for a dominant share in their 
exports and state budget revenues, determining their macroeconomic performance. However, without 
proper strategies and management, they generate structural domestic imbalances that paradoxically 
harm socio-economic development and lead to sub-development. Overall, rent-seeking strategies (with 
low labour intensity and added value) appear to be detrimental to economic growth and lock 
economies and public budgets into dependency on a single sector and one-commodity market, which, 
furthermore, is volatile. Without appropriate action this so-called ‘paradox of plenty’ (or resource 
curse, Dutch disease or ‘oil syndrome’), can have ravaging and long-term socio-economic 
consequences. 
Energy producers also receive public subsidies, generally for large capital-intensive projects but such 
subsidies can also harm economic efficiency as the economic viability of those investment plans is 
rarely properly assessed.  
There are strong links and interactions between energy and other sectors in socio-economic 
development. Public policies addressing current challenges thus need to take a global, cross-sectoral 
view. They need to be well structured and systemic to overcome deep and accumulating socio-
economic difficulties and negative vicious interactions between socio-economic processes and energy. 
In particular, this applies to the costly universal energy subsidy schemes and the penalising oil 
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syndrome. Such integrated socio-economic development and energy/climate policies need to rely 
on three main pillars: 
1. Long-term socio-economic development strategy based on a robust institutional set-up, a 
solid statistical system, enhanced public governance, including for oil revenue management, and 
a poverty reduction strategy with targeted support instead of universal consumption price 
subsidies. 
2. Integrated energy/climate policy articulated in a national energy strategy: security and 
access, regulatory reforms towards full cost-reflective energy prices, energy sector restructuring 
and energy efficiency and renewable energy (EE and RE) action plans in synergy with 
climate change policies (carbon financing). 
3. Regional energy cooperation (intra-Med and EU-MED) to focus on infrastructure (e.g. power 
and gas interconnections) and markets (e.g. EU/SEMCs renewable electricity market), fostered 
by the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and integrated regional financing. 
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1. Introduction to the energy and socio-economic contexts 
The complexity and interdependences between socio-economic sectors, countries and regions 
necessitate a multi-sectoral and integrated analysis in order to accurately assess their main features. An 
in-depth and multi-dimensional approach is also necessary to design, enforce, monitor and evaluate 
public policies, and enhance stakeholders’ (investors, consumers, civil society) information and 
involvement in the development cycle of those public policies. Furthermore, they need to take into 
account the perspective of broad-based political reforms related to the Arab Spring. 
Energy plays a crucial role as a global commodity and as a cornerstone of socio-economic 
development. In the 11 southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs),1 this role is even 
greater with the combined persistence of energy poverty and sizeable exporting energy sectors, with 
their potential curse and burden effects. Given the quantitative and qualitative importance of both 
energy consumption and energy sectors in the socio-economic development of the economies 
analysed, an in-depth understanding of their positive and negative impact is of the utmost importance 
for policy design. Thus, this paper focuses on: 
• The interactions between energy consumption and supply and socio-economic development; 
• The mechanisms and channels of relations between energy supply and demand policies and 
economic and social development; 
• A scenario approach which integrates the national and regional energy policies in synergy with 
the socio-economic development of the region. 
Methodological note: the chosen approach mostly relies on analytical and policy assessment based on 
various sources (MEDPRO technical reports, other reports, studies, publications, academic articles) 
and case studies (e.g. SEMCs energy subsidies). Each listed topic’s rationale (state of the art) is first 
reviewed and then described and specifically analysed for the SEMCs. 
Most of energy data are provided by the International Energy Agency (IEA/OECD). 
1.1 Global SEMCs features 
1.1.1 Macroeconomics2 
The population in the SEMCs amounted to 281 million in 2009 – (Table 1 provides details). Average 
GDP by capita reached USD 7,400 (in PPP) with important disparities between the countries with high 
(Israel: USD 28,700), intermediate income (Turkey: USD 11,600 -PPP and Tunisia: USD 8,500) and 
                                                     
* CASE Fellows. 
1 Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and 
Turkey. 
2 Based on MEDPRO D5.1, Fiscal and macroeconomic database, Technical Report No. 10 “Determinants of 
Growth and Inflation in Southern Mediterranean Countries”, (Coutinho, 2012), and a selection of international 
sources (IMF, WB, UNDP).  
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low-income countries (Egypt: USD 4,200 and Syria: USD 3,500). The majority of the SEMCs 
experienced solid economic growth over the last decade, allowing a certain improvement in living 
standards (improvement in health and primary education services, reduction in illiteracy). The impact 
of the global crisis after 2008 was less severe than in other regions of the world that are more 
dependent on international trade. Nevertheless, the impacts of the crisis and the dramatic increase in 
food and energy prices accentuated financial, budgetary and social imbalances, in particular high 
unemployment among the urban population and youth including graduates. Even if the incidence of 
absolute poverty is in general relatively low, vulnerability is high because large and increasing shares 
of the population live on incomes close to the poverty line (population under the USD 2 (PPP) a day 
threshold: Algeria: 23.6%, Egypt: 18.5%, Jordan: 3.5%, Morocco: 14%, Tunisia: 13%, Turkey: 2% 
(World Bank, 2010; Arab Statistics, 2010). 
1.1.2 Socio-economic development 
Most SEMCs, while experiencing continuous socio-economic development, also face serious and 
structural imbalances, in particular poverty and unemployment. 
Progress in addressing structural poverty in these countries has stagnated since the early 2000s. Taking 
a poverty line of USD 3 per day rather than USD 2 per day would double poverty in the region to 92 
million (Pearce and Mohamadieh, 2009). The Millennium Development Goals  report outlines that 
since 1990 poverty has decreased in all regions except for MENA (including Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, 
Jordan and Palestine) (United Nations, 2010). Actually, poverty has increased in the region with a high 
share of population close to the poverty threshold. Thus, even small income falls and/or small 
increases of basic goods prices can push them into poverty.  
Along with poverty and unequal revenue distribution, SEMCs suffer from structural unemployment 
(officially ranging from 9 to 13% but alternative estimations indicate 20 to 30%), especially affecting 
women (14%) and young people (22%), even with sustained economic growth. The main explanations 
include a rapid demographic increase associated with a young population, a relatively inefficient 
education system and the domination of economic sectors with limited job creation capacities and high 
volatility (e.g. retail trade, real estate and the financial sector). Since 2008, the global economic and 
financial crisis has increased unemployment, which is also combined with high informal employment 
(Pearce and Mohamadieh, 2009).  
1.1.3 Energy features and policies 
1.1.3.1 Energy features 
The energy situation of most SEMCs is characterised by a rapid increase of energy demand (5-8% 
annually),3 low efficiency in both supply and demand, artificially low domestic energy prices as the 
result of generalised and costly consumption subsidies combined with high non-payment rates. As a 
result of low-cost recovery for electricity, current customer electricity prices in most SEMCs are well 
below the generating costs of renewable energy technologies (such as wind) and even below 
generation costs relying on fossil fuels4 (see graph in Annex 1). Oil product prices are also distorted by 
high universal price consumption subsidies that are a heavy burden on public finances. According to 
the World Bank, “The region is lagging behind in implementing reforms in the electricity sector and 
lacks private sector investment” (World Bank, 2010a). Thus, energy companies, which are mostly 
public monopolies, suffer from chronic deficit (the ‘scissor effect’ of insufficient revenues to cover 
increased investment and maintenance costs).  
                                                     
3 With a 7% annual increase, capacity has to double every 10 years.  
4 In particular due to low prices (Egypt: 2 c€/kWh, ALG: 3.5c€/kWh, Morocco: 6.5c€/kWh, Tunisia: 9c€/kWh) 
and distribution losses (mostly-non-payment) (Algeria: 20-25%, Egypt: 20-25%, Lebanon: 40%)); average 
inland wind generation cost is at around 6€c/kWh (without transport and distribution cost. 
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Infrastructure is generally outdated and saturated by rapid population and economic growth and 
urbanisation, leading to deteriorating security and quality of supply, especially for electricity (chronic 
blackouts in Algeria and Egypt at peak hours). Actually, under current trends (the ‘Business as usual’ 
scenario), total energy demand in SEMCs is expected to rise by as much as 70% by 2020, of which 
fossil fuels will cover 91%, leaving a tiny share for renewable energy (4% or the same level as in 
2009%).5 Given the large projected increase in demand, the total MENA region energy investment 
needs are estimated at over USD 30 billion a year up to 2040, or about 3% of the region’s total 
projected GDP. Such high projected energy investment needs is around three times above global 
average (World Bank, 2010a), and represents increased risks and negative socio-economic impacts. 
Furthermore, the volatility of international oil prices aggravates economic, financial and social 
imbalances.6 This persistent vicious circle appears unsustainable in the short to medium term. Finally, 
those imbalances, especially low energy tariffs and high consumption subsidies, are also major 
barriers to both energy efficiency (EE) and renewable energy (RE) deployment.  
In energy supply terms, there are two distinct groups of countries among the in SEMCs: the net 
exporters of hydrocarbons (Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Syria) supplying 22% of the oil imports and 
35% of the gas imports of the whole Mediterranean basin.7 The other countries are importers with a 
very high dependency and costly commercial bills (in Jordan energy imports accounted for around 
13% of its GDP in 2009, in Morocco the same share was 3.5%). On the whole, the SEMCs region is a 
net exporter selling approximately a third (106 Mtoe) of their total energy consumption abroad, or 
more than the total supply of Turkey or Poland. 
SEMCs energy consumption at 1.1 ton of oil equivalent (toe) per capita and 1,770 kWh of electricity 
per capita remains far below levels seen in northern Mediterranean countries. Nonetheless, SEMCs 
energy consumption has been rising fast, exacerbated by high energy intensity, underlining an 
important energy saving potential. However, it remains largely neglected in the region (with the 
exception of Tunisia, which has developed a proactive energy efficiency and renewable energy 
(EE&RE) policy since 1985). The transport sector has recorded the biggest increase of energy 
consumption over the last 30 years in the SEMCs and accounts for approximately one-third of the total 
energy intake. Also, the industrial and residential sectors strongly increased their consumption, to 
account for 36% and 27% respectively of the total intake (2005). 
Fossil fuels (oil, gas, coal) account for 80% of the energy supply of the SEMCs. The share of 
renewable energy, apart from hydropower and biomass, remains limited at less than 3% of primary 
energy supply. Thus, both energy and carbon intensities are relatively high (increasing environmental 
problems such as water and air pollution). Energy import bills are large in absolute and relative terms, 
underlining the high energy dependency of importing countries.  
While most SEMCs have reached close to 100% of electrification coverage,8 groups of the population 
still lack effective access to electricity (e.g. 0.5 million in Egypt, 0.9 m in Morocco and 1.5 m Syria: 
93%), especially in rural areas, and/or still rely on traditional biomass.  
1.1.3.2 Energy policies 
Most SEMCs are at an early stage of energy policy development; currently it is fragmented as well as 
mostly: 
- Supply-oriented (while demand and customer needs are largely neglected); 
                                                     
5 For total energy primary supply - TPES (electricity consumption accounts for 15% of TPES in 2009 and 18% 
in 2020-OME, 2008; MEDPRO/WP 4b. 
6 In Morocco, the deficit of the “Caisse de compensation” reached around 4% of GDP in 2010 (2% in 2007); in 
Egypt: subsidies for energy account for 9.3% of GDP; in Lebanon: 17% of the 2007 public budget was allocated 
to general electricity price subsidies. 
7 Northern and southern rims. 
8 Morocco: 97%, Syria: 93%; 2008. 
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- Energy and export focused (while largely disconnected from other transversal public policies 
such as transport, urbanisation, regional development and environment); 
- Insufficiently based on verifiable evidence (as there is a lack of reliable and accessible 
information and data in the context of powerful stakeholders: public energy monopolies, 
equipment manufacturers, banks); 
- Short-term focused; neglecting long-term vision and synergies with other sectors and 
externalities; 
- Relying on poor or inadequate policy cycles, in particular insufficient stakeholder and public 
consultation, inadequate design, low enforcement or weak monitoring and evaluation 
(feedback). 
The above features result in weak energy administrations that are particularly problematic given the 
strength of dominant energy monopolies. These weaknesses reduce the capacity to design, enforce and 
evaluate effective energy policies. Nevertheless, it should be noted that countries such as Jordan and 
Tunisia, and more recently Morocco, have placed more emphasis on both energy policies and the 
institutional setting. Hydrocarbon exporting countries, such as Algeria and Egypt have established 
relatively strong administrations and companies. 
2. The role of access to energy and energy sector in economic 
and social development 
2.1 Access to energy and role in socio-economic development 
2.1.1 Energy as crucial socio-economic development input 
Energy is an essential commodity for most human activities, directly (as fuel) or indirectly (to provide 
power, light, mobility). 
In traditional societies, populations rely on their own physical strength for labour, then on the power of 
domesticated animals, such as horses and oxen, then on water and wind, steam engines, hydrocarbons 
(fuel motors for land, sea and air vehicles) and finally - electricity. Energy combined with technology 
multiplies human force (e.g. motor fuel for cars, electricity for household appliances), thereby playing 
a crucial role in pre- and post-industrial and then IT societies. For other essential needs such as space 
heating and cooking, the transition has been from local biomass (e.g. firewood, agriculture waste) to 
industrialised fuels (e.g. LPG, natural gas) and also electricity (Stern, 2011). 
Poor access to reliable and affordable modern energy services therefore acts as a barrier to economic 
and social development. 
This socio-economic contribution will be assessed in more detail at economic and social/ human 
development as well as tax levels in the three following sections. 
2.1.1.1 Economic development 
The mechanisms at play – an overview 
Since the industrial revolution, energy has been a crucial ingredient of economic development. It is a 
direct (e.g. used in the industrial process and transport) and indirect input (the energy content of used 
goods, equipment and services) for most productive processes in primary sectors (mining, agriculture), 
industry and services, including transport and IT. 
Industry absorbs 30% of the world energy consumption and uses it in all its transformation processes 
(e.g. heating, drying, and melting) and as a mechanical and driving force. Road, rail, sea and air 
transport mostly depends on oil products and increasingly on electricity, accounting for 27% of total 
consumption. These first two major sectors, industry and transport, which absorb almost 60% of 
global energy consumption, mostly rely on commercial energies. Service activities (e.g. education, 
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trade, offices, tourism etc.) like the residential sector, abundantly use energy to meet their multiple 
needs (lighting, cooking, hot water, heating, air-conditioning, IT, telecommunication, refrigeration and 
other electric household appliances). With agriculture, which mostly uses mechanical force and 
energy-intensive inputs such as fertilizers, these sectors account for 33% of the total consumption of 
energy (Laponche, 2005).  
The expanded provision and use of energy services is strongly associated with sustainable economic 
development and growth. The Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (2002) explicitly 
recognised the privileged place of energy in the construction of a durable human development. 
The combination of crossed energy and sectoral interdependences has reinforced the energy 
dependence of most economic sectors so that a disruption to electricity or oil supply would bring about 
a rapid standstill. Beyond the security of energy supply, its accessibility and affordability are also 
important factors to consider. The process of converting economic inputs (capital, labour, goods and 
various forms of energy such as oil, coal etc.) into economic outputs such as manufactured goods and 
services can be expressed using an equation called the production function. 
In order to fulfil the objective of economic growth, which is the basis of economic and social 
development, it is necessary to have access, at affordable prices, to abundant and diverse energy 
forms, primarily commercial, which feed into the economic grid. A common policy objective is to 
make the required energy available to economic agents at best cost. As economies develop, energy 
consumption initially grows more or less in parallel to economic growth. An adequate, secure and 
affordable energy supply is thus needed to meet the needs of the business and domestic users, 
including the transport of people and goods. 
However, it leaves open the question of how important energy is as a direct causal factor in economic 
development. In order to find out how influential energy input is on its effect output on an aggregate 
basis, the ratio between energy consumption and output (its associated value and thus GDP, one of the 
indicators of economic growth or in physical units) is the most frequently used indicator. This energy 
intensity at a product/service, production unit, company, region and country level indicates the share 
of energy in output. While the primary and industrial sectors have a generally high energy intensity, 
service sectors are less intensive but qualitatively very dependent on energy, especially IT and 
transport. 
Advanced industrialised economies use less energy per unit of economic output (EU27: 0.14 
toe/thousand USD PPP but more per capita (EU27: 3.3 toe) than traditional and poorer societies 
(Africa: 0.26 toe/thousand USD PPP and 0.67 toe/capita), especially those in pre-industrial stage (0.09 
and 0.11 toe/thousand USD PPP and 0.18 and 0.35 toe/capita respectively for Bangladesh and 
Cambodia). The use of energy per unit of economic output significantly declines over time and in 
more advanced stages of industrialisation and post-industrialisation reflecting the adoption of more 
efficient technologies for production and use, combined with structural changes of the economy (trend 
to switch from primary to services activities) (Stern, 2003). Also, the heavy reliance on GDP data to 
calculate energy intensity can be misleading in comparing regions and countries, as GDP does not 
integrate informal and black economies. Also, the high level of GDP in industrialised economies and 
its decoupling from energy use has structurally reduced energy intensity while their energy 
consumption ratio per capita is high and overall energy dependency is pronounced.  
Data analysis (Stern, 2003 and 2011) highlights a strong correlation between per capita energy 
consumption and development level (measured by GDP per capita) (see Figure 1). Furthermore, time 
series analyses confirm this correlation with the level of economic development. 
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Figure 1. Energy consumption per capita and GDP per capita (2009) 
 
Sources: IEA, 2010, IMF, 2010 (sample of 52 OECD, emerging and developing countries). 
Beyond the correlation between energy consumption and GDP, the IEA has developed the Energy 
Development Index (EDI) that mirrors the UNDP’s Human Development Index and is composed of 
four indicators:  
• Per capita commercial energy consumption: an indicator of the overall access to modern energy 
and somehow of the economic development of a country; 
• Share of population with access to electricity; 
• Per capita electricity consumption in the residential sector: an indicator of household access to 
electricity services and an indication of consumers’ ability to pay for them (but not sufficient 
when bill payment problems exist); 
• Share of modern fuels in total residential sector energy use, which serves as an indicator of the 
level of access to clean cooking facilities. 
The increased availability of energy services might be a key to stimulate economic development along 
the different stages of the development process. The evidence underscores the importance of energy in 
economic development (Quoilin, 2005). Nevertheless, what is the causality and correlation between 
the two variables? Can one affirm that access to energy favours development? Or on the contrary that 
development supports energy consumption? Or perhaps a third variable exists inducing the two 
effects? The answer is probably at the intersection of these three proposals. One can in any case affirm 
that the development is concomitant with energy consumption. Also, the interactions among energy, 
other sectors, and economic activity significantly evolve along the various development stages. 
Clearly, more analytical work appears to be necessary to better understand the relationships between 
them and the role of energy in economic growth and development. 
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Global access to reliable energy services that could include renewable energy sources at tariffs (of 
connection and consumption) compatible with economic actors’ incomes has a strong potential for 
positive socio-economic development in particular through the:  
• Creation of new activities and employment;  
• Generation of incomes for landowners; 
• Reduction of rural migration;  
• Use of local resources instead of imports;  
• Knowledge acquired by the technicians and managers of installations. 
On the contrary, when energy services are hardly available or insecure (no connections/access, 
shortages/cuts, energy poverty), this does create bottlenecks, structural barriers, and extra cost at micro 
and macro levels. 
Situation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries  
Table 1 presents key social and energy indicators of SEMCs. 
Table 1. SEMCs macro-economic and energy data and indicators (2009) 
 
Compared to low-income developing countries (mostly those of Sub-Saharan Africa), the SEMCs 
economic and energy specificities include: 
• Smaller agriculture and rural share in the labour force and GDP;  
• Larger and more diverse industrial sectors; 
• Transport, water and energy infrastructures cover large to medium economic centres; 
• Smaller grey and black sectors; 
• Almost comprehensive access to commercial energy: electrification at almost 100%, fossil fuels 
such as LPG largely replaced biomass; 
• The diversity of energy use is already well advanced (transport, industrial process, space 
cooling), especially for electricity and in rapid increase (with the multiplying effect of 
demographic and urban developments); 
• Modern and intermediate energy technologies along integrated chains (production, 
transformation, distribution and use).  
  
 Population 
(in million)
GDP (PPP) in 
bn USD 2000
GDP 
(PPP) per 
capita 
USD/year
Net energy 
imports 
(Mtoe)
Primary 
energy 
consumption 
(Mtoe)
 Final
 electricity
 consuption
 )TWh(
Primary 
energy 
consumpti
on per 
capita   
(toe/cap.)
Final 
electricity 
consuption 
per capita  
(kWh/cap.)
Energy 
intensity 
(toe/1,00
0 USD) 
(PPP)
CO2 
emissions 
(Mt of 
CO2)
Carbon 
intensity 
(kg 
CO2/1,00
0 USD) 
(PPP)
Algeria 34,9 226,3 6 484 ‐111,7 39,8 33,9 1,14 971 0,18 92,5 0,41
Egypt 83,0 362,1 4 363 ‐15,0 72,0 123,5 0,87 1 488 0,20 175,4 0,48
Israel 7,4 192,2 25 833 19,5 21,6 49,5 2,90 6 647 0,11 64,6 0,34
Jordan 6,0 35,4 5 940 7,2 7,5 12,5 1,26 2 097 0,21 19,2 0,54
Lebanon 4,2 25,8 6 114 6,7 6,6 13,1 1,56 3 104 0,26 19,3 0,75
Lybia 6,4 70,7 11 012 ‐66,4 20,4 26,1 3,18 4 065 0,29 50 0,71
Morocco 32,0 174,8 5 463 14,9 15,1 23,9 0,47 747 0,09 41,3 0,24
OPT* 3,8 4,5 1 184 1,1 1,1 4,3 0,30 1 132 0,25 3,1 0,69
Syria 21,1 78,3 3 711 ‐2,8 22,5 31,3 1,07 1 484 0,29 59,8 0,76
Tunisia 10,4 90,4 8 667 1,6 9,2 13,7 0,88 1 314 0,10 20,8 0,23
Turkey 71,9 789,0 10 974 70,3 97,7 165,1 1,36 2 296 0,12 256,3 0,32
TOTAL 281,2 2049,5 7 289 ­74,75 313,5 496,9 1,11 1 767 0,15 802,3 0,39
Source: Key World Energy Statistics, IEA, 2011
* 2008 data, Statistical Office of the Palestinian Authority (GDP at current prices)
PPA: purchasing power parity
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At the same time, SEMCs, compared with their northern industrialised neighbours, differ notably by: 
• Less developed and diversified service sectors and larger agriculture and handicraft sectors; 
• Industry still focuses on primary processing with specialisation in labour-intensive sectors 
(textile, food processing); 
• Commodity infrastructures are less developed and dense, especially for transport with a 
predominance of outdated road passenger and freight fleet; 
• Informal sectors are more widespread; 
• Energy poverty is higher and structural as combined with social inequalities despite increasing 
potential access to commercial energy; 
• Use of appliances remains much more limited for most of the customers due to lack of resources 
and limited access to recent and diverse equipment. 
To sum up, SEMCs’ interconnections between energy services and the economy as a whole 
represent the intermediate model between those of developing and industrialised countries. 
SEMCs show a strong correlation between energy intensity and GDP per capita. Nevertheless, 
their energy intensities appear lower than those of developing countries but higher than in 
industrialised countries (which have largely decoupled energy use from GDP). Overall, energy 
consumption in SEMCs has major impacts on the main macro-economic parameters of the 
countries, their tax revenues and social development. 
The above differences with both southern and northern neighbours can explain the interactions 
between energy and economic development in SEMCs, including: 
- An extensive development of commercial energy (in particular LPG, natural gas and 
electricity), which has contributed to a first stage of an economic ‘catching up’ effect. 
Further contribution depends, however, on an effective and broader access of economic 
agents to energy (especially electricity) and availability of the adequate and energy-
efficient equipment and appliances; 
- Decoupling energy intensity from economic growth and development thanks to more 
rational and efficient energy use has not yet started (with the remarkable exception of 
Tunisia whose primary energy intensity dropped by 27% between 1990 and 2011). 
In the SEMCs, the access to modern energy (in particular LPG, natural gas and electricity) and energy 
services (commercialisation based on official services and tariffs) has been key to the economic 
development of all sectors, in particular industry and commercial services and also as a condition to 
attract investment, in particular FDI. The electrification coverage reaches almost 100% of the 
population in most countries, illustrating spectacular progress. 
Nevertheless, there are constraints and barriers in access to electricity and gas connection at an 
affordable price, especially in the case of small businesses and handicrafts (often semi-official or 
informal) in isolated rural areas or dense urban areas. Also, electricity black-outs primarily affect those 
areas compromising the operation and reliability of business activities. Thus, improving the effective 
access of local businesses to energy services appears to be a priority to enhance their viability. 
Figure 2 illustrates the link between electricity consumption and GDP in SEMCs. 
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Figure 2. Relation between GDP and electricity consumption for MED 11 and EU countries (2009) 
 
Source: Key World Energy Statistics, IEA, 2011. 
2.1.1.2 Tax revenues  
In most countries, energy consumption is taxed, providing an important source of budget revenues, 
especially through VAT and excise taxes on oil products. Also, they contribute (or are supposed to) to 
compensate energy consumption externalities (roads, health). 
Looking at the market price of a barrel of refined oil in OECD countries, energy taxes account, on 
average, for 68% of the price while 16% returns to the oil exporters and 16% are refining and 
distribution margins (OPEC source). This heavy taxation on energy in the region is illustrated in the 
box below concerning Morocco. 
Box 1. Energy taxes in Morocco  
The contribution of energy taxes to Moroccan public revenue is substantial. From 1980 to 1985, they 
accounted for 5 to 6% of the total tax revenues. Then from 1986 to 1994, the oil levy (imposed on the oil 
products on the basis of a fictitious price of 30 USD /barrel instead of 15-17 USD) increased this share to 
between 9% and 14%. Currently, the taxes on oil product consumption (excise tax and VAT) amount to 
almost 7% of the total tax revenues but are well below the government expenses for energy subsidies 
(5% of GDP). The annual oil import bill amounted before 2008 between 12 and 15 billion dirhams (12% 
of value of the total imports) and rocketed to 30-40 billion dirhams since 2008-09. 
2.1.1.3 Social development  
The mechanisms at play – an overview 
Energy is required to meet basic human needs. Thus, population access to modern forms of energy is 
essential for the provision of clean water, sanitation and healthcare. Also, through the provision of 
reliable and efficient lighting, heating, cooking, mechanical power, transport and telecommunication 
services, energy, especially electricity, offer numerous social benefits, including: 
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• Job creation in agriculture and industry (especially food processing) in rural areas;  
• Comprehensive primary education, thanks to lighting, which allows study after sunset in rural 
areas – something that attracts teachers; 
• Reduced child and female mortality and enhanced gender equality: access to electricity and 
efficient fuels and cooking appliances reduce in-house pollution that causes disease; and partly 
frees up women from traditional domestic tasks. 
Strong interactions exist between energy consumption and social conditions in general 
(IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank, 2010), particularly for the situation of women. The provision of 
modern, secure and affordable energy services and appliances (cooking, lighting, cooling) enhance a 
population’s living standards and socio-economic perspectives. On the contrary, the lack of energy, 
and its inefficient use create obstacles to social development with stagnating and poor education, 
health care and transport and telecommunication systems. Actually what matters is not only access to 
energy but also quality, security, modern fuels, appliances and affordability. 
The ratio of annual commercial energy consumption per capita indicates clear differences in social 
development: 
• In countries below 1 toe of annual consumption per capita (and with low electrification and high 
use of traditional biomass), extensive portions of the population have an income below USD 2 
per day, with high illiteracy and fertility as well as infant mortality, and low life expectancy;  
• Above the annual 1 toe consumption per capita, the social standards remain low but poverty is 
less widespread; 
• For those in the annual range of 2-5 toe per capita, as in several recently industrialised 
countries, social conditions improve considerably;  
• Above 5 toe per capita (i.e., the average annual energy consumption in OECD countries) living 
standards are generally high but inequality and energy poverty persists in some countries. 
Electricity appears to play an even greater role in improving household welfare. Electricity is 
perceived by vulnerable populations as the most important service and is critical to increasing 
household income, before water and sanitation (see the World Bank study on Peru - World Bank, 
1999). More recently, access to mobile telecommunications might also have become one of the key 
services with the largest poverty-reducing potential. While the annual electricity consumption per 
capita in EU27 countries averages 6,000 kWh, it is only 560 kWh in Africa (120 kWh in Nigeria). 
Situation in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
Based on the IEA Energy Development Index,9 six SEMCs ranked among the top 12, including 
Lebanon (0.850), Jordan (0.773), Algeria (0.706) and Egypt (0.668) owing to the share of the 
population with access to electricity and share of modern fuels in total residential sector energy use 
(reaching 98-100%). However, the effective access to those services looks more problematic (for 
example, energy poverty and electricity black-outs in Lebanon). Similarly as a strong correlation 
between energy services and economic development has been established in SEMCs and other 
regions, a reliable and affordable access to energy in the residential sector benefits the population, in 
particular in terms of health, education, employment and mobility. For instance, the high access of the 
Jordanian and Tunisian households to energy services corresponds to relatively high welfare and lower 
poverty rates within the region. 
                                                     
9 The indicator can be treated as a measure of energy poverty and is calculated for developing countries as an 
average of four indicators. Values close to 1 indicate a good performance. For detailed ranking of 2011 indicator 
(based on 2009 data) see (www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energydevelopment/ 
theenergydevelopmentindex/). 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHERN MED | 11 
 
2.1.2 Energy as a burden 
While being an asset for economic and human activities, energy may also have negative socio-
economic impacts, such as excessive energy cost (bills). The usual policy response is to use subsidies 
and avoid including most externalities that, in turn, may generate socio-economic imbalances. 
2.1.2.1 Energy bills  
From energy prices to socio-economic effects  
Customer energy bills depend on two factors: the level of consumption and the unit price. For network 
energies (electricity, gas, district heating), a tariff system applies, taking into account the level of 
consumption and the fact of connection and use of the network. In some cases, a flat tariff (the bill 
amount is fixed, based on criteria such as size of flat or number of occupants for residential tariff) may 
apply. An increase of energy prices may result from developments in the global market, higher 
taxation and/or specific national conditions (scarcity or complexity of access to energy resources 
and/or consumers). Higher energy consumption by consumers can be produced by higher economic 
activity, search for greater comfort (e.g. air conditioning), outdated equipment and/or low consumer 
awareness.  
Excessively high energy bills compared to net revenues reduce customers’ purchasing power and hit 
business competitiveness and household welfare. For the most vulnerable sectors of the population, 
high energy bills take up a disproportionately high share of the household budgets and/or reduce 
accessibility to basic services (lighting, food refrigeration); such a situation is known as energy 
poverty.10 Structurally this increases non-payment rates to the detriment of energy infrastructure 
maintenance and investment. 
Many field studies (World Bank, 1999; Barnes and Halpern, 2000) in transition and developing 
countries indicate that the poor are often keen to pay for standard energy services but face high access 
costs (full electricity connection fees of up to USD 600 or deposit and advance payment for LPG 
bottles) or non-availability of services (rural areas: low population densities and urban areas: lack of 
infrastructure or non-suitable conditions, like in slums). Poor households lack cash reserves for such 
fees or lump sums but are generally able to afford the monthly energy service expenses if the service is 
reliable. In addition, replacing non-grid household electricity technologies by the grid prove cheaper11 
with much higher quality of services (e.g. light). 
Energy price increases are passed on to most sectors of the economy and society. In particular, food 
prices, a major component of the household budget in developing countries, rapidly increase because 
of higher transport costs and higher prices of inputs to agriculture (e.g., fertilizers and diesel to operate 
tractors and irrigation pumps). For the poor who use transport services, higher transport costs also 
decrease their effective income. Third, as higher energy prices may reduce GDP growth, household 
income is reduced. 
Situation in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries  
Owing to the scissor effect of relatively low domestic incomes and growing energy dependency (in 
imports and exports) on volatile energy markets, especially of hydrocarbons, energy prices in SEMCs 
have significantly increased. At first, fuel prices, in particular LPG (used for cooking and heating) and 
diesel (local transport and agriculture) have rapidly increased over the period 2007-11 as a result of the 
international oil price surge (the first wave till mid-2008 and then between 2009 and 2011).12 Also, 
electricity prices, which mostly rely on fossil fuels and thus follow international price variations, have 
                                                     
10 Various thresholds are used in EU countries, typically staying around 10% (EPEE, 2009b). 
11 Cost of useful electricity from various sources, in USD/kWh (excluding appliance costs): grid (0.08), dry cell 
batteries (0.53), car batteries (2.30), kerosene (5.87), candles (13.00) - Source: Foster, 2000.  
12 Automotive diesel prices in Europe and North America increased by around 30% between 2009 and 2011 
according to IEA data (www.iea.org/stats/surveys/prices_archives.asp). 
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also increased. Furthermore, like most developing regions, the Mediterranean region was also hit by 
the sudden surge in food prices that culminated in 2008-09. While domestic energy prices in SEMCs 
are lower than in the EU, the level of household incomes is still much lower and poverty is 
widespread. 
These rapid and steady price hikes, combined with relatively high energy inefficiency have increased 
the share of energy in customer expenditure and thus energy poverty and absolute poverty.13 Energy 
expenses have accounted for a growing and significant share of SEMCs household consumption 
baskets, especially for the most vulnerable who have to allocate an excessively high share of their 
incomes for basic fuels (LPG) and electricity, despite the universal consumption price subsidies (see 
below). Thus, access to modern energy services has been jeopardised for an increasing share of the 
poor who see their living standards reduced and/or have to come back to traditional biomass when 
available. This has a negative effect on their overall socio-economic development and perspectives. 
High energy bills and energy burden at the customer level have negative macro-economic 
consequences, both domestic (e.g. high share of energy subsidies in national budget, high energy 
intensity at the expense of competitiveness) and external (e.g. trade deficit). Along the SEMCs, 
Morocco, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon are the most energy-import dependent countries. Over the 
medium to long term, the trend of high, volatile and rising energy prices is expected to continue and 
thus increase the pressure and imbalances both at micro and macro levels in most SEMCs. 
2.1.2.2 Energy consumption subsidies  
The mechanisms at play – an overview 
The usual way to address poverty and energy poverty is to provide subsidies. The OECD defines a 
subsidy as “any measure that keeps prices for consumers below market levels, or for producers above 
market levels or that reduces costs for consumers and producers”. More specifically, the IEA defines 
an energy subsidy as “any government action that concerns primarily the energy sector that lowers the 
cost of energy production, raises the price received by energy producers or lowers the price paid by 
energy consumers”. 
An international report (IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank, 2010) outlined that “energy subsidies can 
thus help address market failures or respond to social and distributional objectives, especially where 
social welfare mechanisms for directly providing income support to the poor do not exist”. Direct or 
indirect subsidies to customers are supposed to enhance the access of poor groups to modern energy 
services, especially electricity through affordable prices or a support system (e.g. vouchers). Further to 
overcoming market failures (e.g. when most efficient technologies cannot enter a market), well-
designed and targeted subsidies can mitigate environmental problems such as encouraging alternatives 
to biomass in areas with serious deforestation or a switch to less polluting fuels (natural gas instead of 
coal or diesel in heating and transport).  
The subsidy aims to reduce the difference between the effective (or market) price without government 
intervention and a socially optimal price. Most frequently, subsidies apply in respect to general energy 
tariffs (for electricity, gas, LPG, motor fuels) directly or indirectly (for example, cross-tariff subsidies 
between various categories of customers; usually business customer tariffs are higher than those for 
households).  
Subsidies to the energy sector can take various forms (tax breaks, financial incentives, grants, R&D 
credits, etc.) and modalities with a direct or indirect effect on energy production costs and/or final 
prices (cf. Table 2 below and section below on producer subsidy). 
 
                                                     
13 Unlike the EU, where the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) regularly surveys EU 
households and includes energy poverty, a tool such as an individualised safety net hardly exist in SEMCs and 
thus energy poverty data are scarce. 
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Table 2. Main types of energy subsidies 
 
Source: “Reforming Energy Subsidies, Opportunities to Contribute to the Climate Change Agenda”, United 
Nations Environment Programme, 2008. 
Another form of subsidy includes an insufficient integration of externalities in the final price. Indeed, 
each segment of the energy chain impacts on its close vicinity and beyond notably by mobilising land, 
mineral resources, water and use of infrastructures, causing local pollution and contributing to global 
climate change and thus generating costs for other actors (e.g. cost remediation, health expenses). 
Thus, without internalisation of these costs, the fossil fuel industries and also the consumption benefit 
from an indirect subsidy that is provisionally left apart or partly covered by the taxpayer but sooner or 
later will need to be covered by those involved. 
While the principle of subsidising energy appears coherent with socio-economic development (cf. the 
crucial role of energy above), ensuring that the benefits are effectively provided to the households 
most in need has proven problematic.  
Overall, generalised or universal direct consumption price subsidies that benefit all customers appear 
rather inefficient as on average only 8% of fossil fuel subsidies go to the most vulnerable (IEA, 2010). 
In some cases, they may not even reach the poor at all (IEA/UNEP 2002). The main reasons for this 
low efficiency are as follows:  
• The poorest households may be unable to afford to pay even for subsidised energy but above all 
for the high connection fees and appliance costs. Also, they may have no physical access to the 
energy system, for instance, in isolated rural areas or urban slums (no electricity grid 
connection) or when they are not considered as viable customers by energy companies; 
• When poor households are able to purchase energy at subsidised prices, their consumption is 
generally modest and sometimes capped (e.g. electricity lifeline or block tariff, which can 
nevertheless provide a more effective support to poor and limit distortions towards richer 
customers). Thus, the share of the subsidy remains low in their revenues and does not 
significantly reduce poverty. 
In addition, those who generally benefit most from the universal consumption price subsidies are the 
wealthiest customers, especially in urban areas, whose energy consumption is much higher. A subsidy 
scheme being indifferently addressed to all consumers, without taking into account income thresholds 
implies that, in fact, most of the subsidies benefit the less vulnerable households but paradoxically, 
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poor households have also to contribute to the financing of subsidies (through indirect taxes such as 
VAT).  
Low administrated prices with caps or ceilings often create physical shortages and thus lead to 
administrative rationing14 that is generally circumvented by middle and high revenue households 
through favouritism and corruption at the expense of the poor. 
Universal consumption price subsidies are also criticised because artificially low energy prices distort 
the price signals, in particular for medium and large customers and thus the supply/demand balance. 
They inflate demand at the expense of the energy sector (pushed to chronically increase investments to 
follow rapid demand increase but without sufficient resources), trade balance (either increasing 
imports or reducing exports) and the environment (local pollution). By distorting price signals, they 
become structural barriers and strong disincentives for more rational and efficient use of energy as 
well the deployment of renewable energy.  
Also, by increasing demand price subsidies deteriorate the balance of payments and energy supply 
security by increasing a country’s dependence on energy and imports. Finally, lower prices of fuels 
such as diesel or LPG favour their smuggling to neighbouring countries where the retail prices are 
higher. As universal consumption price subsidies create artificial prices, they undermine the energy 
sector economic capacities to adequately maintain and invest in infrastructure, including in more 
efficient technologies. 
Also, the external costs (generally to address the consequences of health and environmental damages 
caused by energy production and use) are generally poorly estimated, especially in the medium- to 
long-term. This creates a collective but hidden and postponed burden to be covered in future.  
Universal consumption price subsidies can place a heavy and barely controllable burden on state 
budgets as volumes of subsidised energy are large and international prices are volatile. Governments 
therefore prefer, for political reasons, to keep subsidies ‘off-budget’ with a universal (administrated) 
consumption price, especially with state-owned energy companies, to make them less visible and less 
subject to scrutiny on the funds allocated and their effective efficiency. By contrast, ’on-budget’ 
subsidies are more transparent and open to debate, notably by tax- payers. 
Generally, the tax-payers (through the state of regional budgets) and/or productive sectors (through 
cross-tariff subsidies) finance such schemes. For the first, their income is affected and for the second, 
their energy bills increase at the expense of competiveness (see above). An indirect and significant 
cost is the lost fiscal revenue owing to the reduced price as well as the common illegal trading and 
trade of highly subsidised fuels. Also, transaction costs may be high and the impact evaluation 
difficult to conduct because of the lack of data and specific monitoring of energy consumption and 
poverty. Thus, what is at stake is the type of subsidy scheme and its effective enforcement. 
The multiple impacts of energy subsidies on the energy supply chain and other sectors are illustrated 
in Figure 3. 
  
                                                     
14 In Egypt, the administration rations LPG cylinders, generating abuses and administrative costs while being 
largely inefficient. 
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Figure 3. Social, economic and environmental impacts of energy subsidies  
 
Source: IEA/OPEC/OECD/World Bank, 2010 (from UNEP). 
Energy subsidies are generally considered as a major component of the social safety net for the poor, 
guaranteeing the availability of affordable goods. However, the use of universal price subsidy scheme 
has proven highly expensive, as we argued above. In policy terms, the intent to address a social issue 
with only general energy price rebates is clearly misleading. 
Box 2. IEA focus on energy consumption subsidies 
Estimating the amount of subsidies can be difficult because of differences in definitions, methodologies 
and the transparency of fiscal systems; it is difficult to compare regional or individual country studies 
measuring the magnitude and impact of energy subsidies 
Fossil-fuel consumption subsidies worldwide amounted to USD 409 billion in 2010, with subsidies 
to oil products representing almost half of the total. Oil subsidies make up almost half the total fossil 
fuel consumption subsidies, with electricity making up 30%, natural gas 22% and coal less than 1%. 
Persistently high oil prices have made the cost of subsidies unsustainable in many countries and 
prompted some governments to try to reduce them. In a global survey covering 37 countries where 
subsidies exist, at least 15 have taken steps to phase them out since the start of 2010. Without further 
reform, the cost of fossil-fuel consumption subsidies is set to reach USD 660 billion in 2020, or 0.7% of 
global GDP (at market exchange rates). 
Fossil-fuel subsidies carry large costs. They encourage wasteful consumption, exacerbate energy-price 
volatility by blurring market signals, incentivise fuel adulteration and smuggling, and undermine the 
competitiveness of renewables and other low-emission energy technologies. For importing countries, 
they often impose a significant fiscal burden on state budgets, while for producers they quicken the 
depletion of resources and can reduce export earnings over the long term. Furthermore, they are 
inefficient means of assisting the poor: only 8% of fossil-fuel subsidies in 2010 were distributed to the 
poorest 20% of the population.  
Note: The IEA (as other international organisations) subsidy estimates are based on the differential between 
domestic and international market prices. On its side, OPEC and others use the cost of production as 
benchmark. 
Source: IEA/WEO 2010 (www.iea.org/weo/Files/ff_subsidies_slides.pdf , www.iea.org/files/energy_subsidies.pdf). 
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Situation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
Energy subsidy schemes are widespread in SEMCs. They mostly consist of universal direct energy 
price reductions focused on LPG (used for cooking and heating), diesel (local transport and 
agriculture) and electricity (general and agriculture). Subsidies to fuels (LPG, diesel) account for the 
largest share, followed by electricity and natural gas. Subsidies have been covering an increasing share 
of the final energy cost as the gap between the international market and the social price is widening. 
Also, as subsidised universal prices benefit all customers in a context of rapid demographic growth, 
the nominal and real value of energy subsidies increased over the period 2002-2010 to become 
substantial in most countries, often accounting for the largest share of the government expenditures. In 
2007, subsidies to fuels in SEMCs ranged from below 2% of the government expenditures in Israel, to 
more than 15% in Egypt. Also, Syria and Palestine spend more than 20% of their current expenditures 
on subsidies (fuel accounting for a large share). In 2009, energy subsidies accounted for a significant 
share of GDP in Egypt (6% and 11.9% in 2010) (AfrDB, 2012)15 and Syria (5%) but were lower in 
Jordan (2%)-see also Annex 2: Energy subsidies in SEMCs. 
Furthermore, the 2007/2008 and 2009/2011 price increases confronted southern Mediterranean policy-
makers with serious challenges, particularly in net-importer countries. As a result of the surge in fuel 
prices that culminated in 2008, fiscal expenditures on fuel subsidies increased much quicker than 
planned (the difference was over 2% of GDP in 2008 - ECOFIN, 2011). Also, for most countries the 
size of fuel subsidies has been notably higher than those to food (300-600 USD/capita/year - see Table 
3).  
In absolute terms and worldwide, two SEMCs are listed among the top 25 countries for energy 
subsidies in 2010: Egypt (6th; total energy subsidies: USD 20 billion or 11.9% of GDP, 250 
USD/capita) and Algeria (12th; total energy subsidies: USD 10 billion or 6.6% of GDP, 300 
USD/capita) (IEA, 2010). 
The funding of these subsidies varies across countries. In the Maghreb, Morocco and Tunisia created 
“Caisses Générales de Compensation” (CGC) that are managed outside public budgets but funded by a 
state subsidy and/or parafiscal tax. CGCs make up the difference between the market price and the 
fixed price for a selection of energy products (LPG, diesel, electricity) to compensate distributors. In 
other countries, social ministries directly intervene through the state budget. 
The impact of subsidies in the region is multiple as described above. In particular, universal energy 
subsidies encourage rent-seeking behaviour, energy waste and fuel smuggling,16 and largely prevent 
supply diversification, in particular with renewable energy. As a result, SEMCs’ economies are both 
energy and carbon intensive and, in contrast to other regions, the situation is deteriorating there. The 
rapidly growing energy demand can hardly be satisfied because of the structural underinvestment and 
lack of sufficient maintenance of domestic infrastructure. Finally, the subsidy schemes are largely 
inefficient to reduce energy poverty as they remain captured by higher income and interest groups. 
                                                     
15 Based on full economic cost (gap between the real price and the reference price). 
16 In particular in the Mashrek (between Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), between Egypt and the Palestinian 
territories, between Algeria and Morocco (as official borders are closed) and between Tunisia and Libya (in 
particular after the 2011 Libyan uprising). 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHERN MED | 17 
 
Table 3. Energy subsidies in SEMCs (2010 or most recent available data) 
 Share of residential 
sector in final 
energy consumption 
(in %, 2009) 
Subsidy mechanism 
(universal energy price 
subsidy individual 
support) 
Level of subsidy: total/ 
per fuel 
(in % of final price) 
Main energy 
subsidies 
(in USD bn) 
Total subsidies 
(% of GDP/state 
budget) 
Financing scheme Overall efficiency 
to reduce poverty 
Algeria 33% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
Total: 59.8%/electricity: 
35% 
Fuels (8.5), 
natural gas (NA), 
electricity (2.1) 
6.6/- Indirect (state 
company deficit 
are covered by the 
state) 
Limited 
Morocco 22% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
LPG: 250%, diesel: 66%, 
gasoline: 35%, fuel oil: 
91%, electricity: NA 
4.8 (2011) 5%/20% Specific fund 
(CGC) 
Limited (42% of 
subsidies benefit 
to rich household 
and enterprises) 
Tunisia 31% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
LPG: 144%, diesel: 37%, 
gasoline: 19%, fuel oil: 
64%, natural gas: 86%, 
electricity:44% 
1.1 (2007), 2.2 
(2010) 
5%/15% Specific fund  Limited 
Egypt 22% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
Total: 55.6%/LPG/ 90%, 
diesel: 75%, natural gas: 
80%, electricity: 10% 
Fuels (14.1), 
natural gas (2.4), 
electricity (3.8) 
11.9%/15% 
(2010) 
State budget Limited (only 
13% of the 
subsidy go to 
20% poorest) 
Israel 23% - -  2% (est.) -  
Jordan 21% Individual support and 
universal consumption 
price subsidy 
NA  2% - Improved* 
Lebanon 36% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
Electricity/ NA  4% GDP/17% 
budget (only 
electricity) 
State budget Limited 
OPT 60% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
NA  NA State budget Limited 
Syria 16% Universal consumption 
price subsidy 
NA  NA NA  
Notes: fuels mostly consist of LPG and diesel. Social tariffs (lifeline rate) for low purchasing power users are used in several SEMCs (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia). 
* Jordan: a detailed evaluation of the new individual support scheme is not yet available but appears to be  much more effective than the previous universal price subsidy (only 7% of the subsidy 
used to benefit the 25% poorest households) even if partially reintroduced in 2011. 
Sources: IEA, IMF, World Bank, national statistics. 
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The following table provides an assessment of the price subsidy mechanisms in place in SEMCs net-
energy importing countries. The administrated price or universal subsidy scheme clearly dominates. 
Table 4. Domestic fuel price subsidy mechanisms in net energy importing SEMCs 
 Situation and reforms Developments 
Jordan Increased fuel prices in 2005 and 2008, making most 
fuels reflect international prices. A committee of 
representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Energy, 
and Trade, and from the Jordanian Petroleum Refinery 
Company adjusts the prices of petroleum products 
monthly, based on a formula that follows the changes 
in the price of Brent crude oil during the previous 30 
days. 
In January 2011 Jordan temporarily 
suspended its automated adjustment 
mechanism, owing to increased social 
and political pressure, and reduced 
prices and taxes on fuel. 
Lebanon Fuel price subsidies were de facto eliminated in 
October 2008 with the reintroduction of fuel excise 
taxes; final fuel prices are issued weekly via ministerial 
decree basing the price on cost (including distribution 
costs and station margins) plus fuel excise taxes. 
In early 2011, the Lebanese 
government reduced fuel excise taxes 
in response to high world market 
prices and increasing domestic 
political tensions. 
Morocco After ad hoc fuel price rises in 1999 and 2005, 
Morocco increased domestic prices in 2006 for all 
products, except butane/LPG, to reflect import prices at 
the time, and introduced an automated, index-linked 
adjustment mechanism that would adjust prices in 
proportion to international price variations exceeding 
2%. 
Rising costs of newly built-up fuel 
subsidies in 2011 caused the country 
to contemplate a move from universal 
subsidies to targeted transfers in the 
future. In June 2012, the government 
increased the price of automotive 
fuels (gasoline +20% and diesel 
+14%) to intend to reduce the 
increase of fuel subsidies. 
Tunisia After ad hoc fuel price rises in 2005 and 2007, the 
government decided in January 2009 to cap the 
subsidies at the level they reached when oil cost USD 
52 per barrel. Whenever the international price of oil 
exceeded the reference price of USD 52 per barrel by 
USD 10 over a period of three consecutive months, 
prices of petroleum products increase by an a priori 
fixed amount. In early 2010 the reference price was 
raised to USD 60 per barrel 
In September 2012, the government 
increased the price of gasoline by 
7.3% and diesel by 7.9%. 
Source: Fattouh, 2012, author updates. 
In the Mediterranean region, those externalities and associated costs are generally insufficiently 
covered by the industry as regulation (‘polluters pay’ principle) are not yet adopted and/or 
insufficiently enforced. Furthermore, large energy infrastructures in highly populated and imbricated 
urban areas along coasts and rivers cause higher damages and strain on resources. Nevertheless, the 
insufficient or inadequate integration of a sufficient share of external costs (apparent to indirect 
subsidy) appears even less researched and monitored by authorities although associated costs at local 
and national levels can be significant. 
SEMCs and Iran country profiles on energy subsidies 
Algeria 
To guarantee prices accessible to all, the Algerian state subsidises a large number of food goods of 
first need but also electricity and fuels. Another objective is to attract FDI in energy intensive 
industries (e.g. petrochemical) and support domestic product competitiveness. The government budget 
does not officially include energy subsidies while the authorities provide energy price ‘support’ or 
‘implicit subsidies’ by keeping administrated energy prices below the real costs. The Algerian energy 
customers, private individuals or businesses pay these products neither at market prices, nor at cost-
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recovery prices but at the administered prices. That led to the two-tier pricing system: lower prices for 
industrial sector and household consumption, and international prizes. The subsidy to the price of gas 
is primarily intended for industry, in particular petrochemical. For electricity, the subsidy amounts to 
35%. 
Energy subsidies apply to all consumers because there is no targeted income support to households. 
Thus, this system appears very unfair: large companies or multinationals profit from subsidised prices, 
whereas most of the poor population only partly profits from it. The subsequent losses of the state 
energy companies are either covered by other customers or by the state budget. The amount of energy 
subsidies is not known.  
Morocco 
The energy price subsidy in Morocco targets LPG (around 250% of final price) and diesel (66% 
compared to international prices) that are important for households. LPG is primarily used by 
households for cooking and to a lesser extent for heating but industry and agriculture (water pumping) 
have been using increasing volumes. For diesel, the public transport cost is targeted. The price 
difference is covered by the Moroccan “Caisse de compensation” (see above) whose deficit more than 
doubled to 32 billion dirhams17 in 2011 to reach 5% of GDP (around 20% of state budget or two-thirds 
of total investment) following the rise of the price of crude oil and its consumption (4% in 2010 and 
2% in 2007). 
However, general price subsidies provide benefits to middle income high-income households (with 
several cars), SMEs and large industries and agriculture rather than households in energy poverty. 
Those customers account for 42% of total energy subsidies. The subsidies granted to LPG and diesel 
worsens consumption distortions by directing more consumers towards these energies and without 
encouraging a rational consumption. In June 2012, the government pressed by the continuous increase 
of fuel subsidies and the lack of financing, increased the administrated prices of gasoline by 20% and 
diesel by 14% and is considering possible targeted support. 
Tunisia 
General energy subsidy scheme in Tunisia supports administrated prices below costs. The subsidies 
(2010) are particularly high for: 
- LPG: 144% (cost-recovery price at 18.3 dinars per bottle of 13 kg against an administrated selling 
price of 7.5 Tunisian Dinars (TND)/bottle); 
- Diesel: 21 % (cost-recovery price at 1.162 dinar/litre against an administrated selling price of 
0.960 TND/litre); 
- Fuel oil: 75% (cost-recovery price at 738 TND/t against an administrated selling price of 420 
TND/t); 
Thus, the subsidy for the oil products would reach 1.070 million TND in 2010 (on the basis of a Brent 
crude price at 80 USD/bbl and a parity dollar/dinar at 1.48. 
In the same way, electricity and gas are very strongly subsidised:  
- Domestic electricity tariff: subsidy of 44% (cost-recovery price: 180 millimes/kWh net of tax 
against an average administrated selling tariff of 125 millimes/kWh); 
- Natural gas: 86% (cost-recovery price: 539 TND/toe against an average administrated selling tariff 
of 289 dinars/toe).  
Also, the feed connection for gas is symbolic for the consumer, since s/he pays only 140 TND (in 
monthly instalments, at the rate of 3.5 TND/months) instead of 500 TND. Thus, the subsidy for 
electricity and gas in 2010 would be in the range of 1.050 million TND including 582 million TND as 
indirect subsidy and 468 million dinars for the direct subsidy. 
                                                     
17 17 billion dirhams budgeted and extra 15 billion dirhams. 
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Moreover, the adjustment of administrated prices has not followed inflation leading to a chronic 
deficit of the energy companies, in particular STEG, which has to receive grants from the state. Thus 
the total subsidy to the energy sector would reach 2.1 billion dinars (€1.1 billion) in 2010 or 11% of 
the state budget expenditure (5% of GDP). In September 2012, the government, pressed by the 
continuous increase of subsidies and the lack of financing, increased of the administrated prices 
gasoline by 20% and diesel by 14%) and is considering possible targeted support. 
At the same time, a progressive reduction of the fuel price subsidy levels has been combined with an 
active and operational set of actions to reduce sustainably the fuel consumption (combining energy 
savings, efficiency and use of renewable energy, in particular solar water heaters through the PROSOL 
programme).  
Egypt 
Energy price subsidies in Egypt are large in relative and absolute terms. The subsidy rate amounts to 
above 75% for oil products and natural gas (almost 90% for LPG, 75% for diesel, 80% for natural gas) 
and 30% for electricity. This translates into a heavy annual fiscal burden of 83 billion Egyptian pound 
(EGP) or USD 5 billion in 2010, i.e. 67% of total subsidies, above 15% of the total state budget 
expenses, and 11.9 % of GDP18. Furthermore, they increased by 56% between 2007 and 2009 
following the increase if international oil prices. They were estimated to reach a level of 100 billion 
EGP (USD 6 billion) in 2011 and can slightly decrease to 90 billion EGP in 2012 but accounting to 
almost 20% of total national budget expenses (OME, 2011) and to increase to 120 billion EGP in 2013 
further above the 11.9% share in 2010 GDP (AfrDB, 2012). Subsidies allocated to oil products 
account for the largest share of expenses (40% for diesel and 22% for LPG) to be compared with the 
annual oil and gas exports revenue of USD 10 billion. 
As for other countries, only a minor part (29%) of subsidies reaches the lowest income groups which 
account for at least 43% of the population. The 20% richest receive 39% of subsidies while the 20% 
poorest only 13% (cf. figure 4 below), i.e., the wealthiest receive almost three times more subsidies 
than the poor owing to their higher consumption of motor fuels, natural gas and electricity. Also 
energy-intensive heavy industries (including steel, cement, fertilizers, ceramics and glass) and 
administration (especially security forces) benefit from the price subsidies. 
Price distortions encourage excessive energy consumption, making Egypt’s energy and carbon 
intensities 40% and 60% higher than the EU27 average and twice of MENA average (IEA, 2009). 
They also aggravate pollution and environmental damages and lower hydrocarbon export revenues. 
Various reform plans of the costly and energy subsidy schemes have been undertaken since 2004. In 
2007 the government decreased subsidies on domestic energy prices, including for energy intensive 
industries, and decided in 2008 to reduce domestic energy subsidies by 5% annually. However, non-
energy intensive industries benefited from a six-month freeze in 2010 while inflation was above 10%. 
In late 2011, the interim Trade Minister, Mahmoud Eisa declared “the government would start the 
phase-out with energy-intensive industries, such as steel and cement, adding that many of these firms 
were exporting their products which meant that "they are exporting ... subsidized energy." 
Jordan  
Up to mid-2000s, fuel price subsidies to gasoline, diesel, fuel oil and kerosene accounted for up to 6 % 
of Jordanian budgetary expenditures. As in other countries, the generalised energy price subsidies 
were largely inefficient to target the most vulnerable households: the poorest 40% of the population 
received below 25% of the fuel subsidies and the 25% poorest households - less than 7%. On the 
contrary, the richest 20% of households captured over 40% of the subsidies. In particular this was the 
case of subsidy to gasoline as the poorest families did not own cars. Thus, an International Monetary 
Fund report qualified the fuel price subsidies scheme as “pro-rich” (IMF, 2010). 
                                                     
18 AfDB, 2012.  
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In 2005, the government initiated a gradual phasing out of fuel price subsidies. In early 2008 the oil 
product prices were fully liberalised and price subsidies eliminated for all fuels except LPG. It also set 
up an automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism. The combined increases of administered prices and 
specific taxes on fuel saved the state budget almost USD 200 million per year but increased inflation 
that was also caused by the oil price hikes of 2008. Between 2008 and 2010, the share of energy 
subsidies in the GDP dropped from 5% to 2% (of which fuels from 1.2% to 0.2%). It is also worth 
mentioning that the subsequent price signal has stimulated energy efficiency and the use of renewable 
energy.  
In order to compensate for the impact on households - estimated at 4.4% of their income, the 
authorities put in place several accompanying measures or a social mitigation package. The National 
Aid Fund (NAF) set up an individual safety net that provides direct cash assistance in the winter for 
households earning less than USD 1,400/year to buy heating and cooking fuels. Also, the NAF put in 
place a social assistance (monthly aid of around JD 30 per family member with a maximum of JD 180 
for a five-member family) targeting specific vulnerable groups including the working poor, the 
unemployed and disabled and reinforced its food support programme. A lifeline (or ‘block’) electricity 
tariff for poor households was established.19 In parallel, the government raised the public 
administration wages and pensions at the benefit of around 60% of the total population. This 
individualised cash transfer system targets low-income households. Also, the food support programme 
was reinforced towards the most vulnerable.  
Overall, the annual cost of the individualised social mitigation package was estimated between one-
third to half of annual energy subsidies and with much better targeting and effectiveness against 
energy poverty and poverty.  
However, in the context of a price increase of basic goods and the potential political impact of the 
Arab Spring, in January 2011 the government decided to temporarily re-set administrated and 
subsidised prices for selected fuels (for an estimated annual cost of USD 230 million, including food 
prices) and thus suspending the automatic fuel price adjustment mechanism. Also the combined effect 
of soaring international fuel prices and the interruption of Egyptian gas supplies increased electricity 
supply costs to JD 0.19/kWh (27 USDc/kWh) well above the customer tariffs of 0.083 JD/kWh (11.7 
USDc/kWh). This has resulted for NEPCO, the national power company, in a record deficit in 2011 of 
USD 2.5 billion or 15% of GDP. This deficit is expected to exceed USD 3.5 billion by the end of 
2012. 
Lebanon 
Electricité du Liban (EdL), the national power company, relies heavily on government subsidies (USD 
3.5-4 billion/year or around 3% of GDP in 2009). For the last few years the share of electricity 
subsidies in total primary expenditures fluctuated in the range 10-20%. They primarily target to cover 
the difference between actual costs of oil imports and administratively set theoretical and artificially 
low tariffs (3 to 6 USc/kWh for the first three tariff tranches in 2010) while the marginal generation 
cost is estimated at above 18 USc/kWh, and further up since then (WWF, 2011). This high tariff 
deficit combines with high debt arrears and very high distribution losses at around 40% at the result of 
poor bill and grid management. Thus, EDL has been in virtual bankruptcy (EDL’s deficit in 2010 at 
USD 2.2 billion) and faces fierce social conflicts.  
Despite this large subsidy, the electricity system has been plagued by daily black-outs, forcing 
customers to use individual and private block diesel generators that involve much higher costs 
compared to a situation if the grid was functioning properly. Also this causes serious local pollution 
and safety risks. This also makes EdL highly vulnerable to oil price increases. The generalised energy 
subsidies need to be reformed to better target the most in need and support the power sector reform as 
well as reduce the strain on public finances. 
                                                     
19 Four consumption blocks: 1-160 KWh/month: 32 Fils/kWh; 161-300 KWh/month: 71 Fils/kWh, 301-500 
kWh/month: 85 Fils/kWh, over 500 kWh/month: 113 Fils/kWh. 
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Syria 
Confronted with increasingly high expenses for fuel subsidies (amplified by significant oil smuggling 
to neighbouring countries) and lower oil export revenues, leading to drain foreign exchange reserves, 
Syria started to reform its fuel subsidy scheme in 2008, following similar patterns as Jordan (Fattouh, 
2012). In 2008 and 2009, diesel price was tripled and those of fuel oil, kerosene and gasoline by more 
than a third. At the same time, salaries in the public sector increased and a rationing coupon system set 
up (up to 1,000 litres of diesel per year and household at a subsidised price and heating oil allowances 
for public sector employees and pensioners). In 2009, targeted cash transfers based on household 
income and energy expenses replaced the coupon system. They were estimated to benefit to around 
half of the population and to be managed by a National Welfare Fund (with individual registers). 
However its creation and the scheme were halted in spring 2011 by the outbreak of political protests 
and the civil war since then. 
Iran 
Until 2010, end-prices of fuels and natural gas in Iran were among the lowest in the world with diesel 
prices at a symbolic 3 USDc/l in 2009 (Egypt: 20 USDc/l, Tunisia: 84 USDc/l, Turkey: 163 USDc/l, 
Germany: 156 USDc/l) yet there was still a need to import (due to insufficient and inadequate oil 
refining capacities). This resulted in extremely heavy universal energy subsidies that reached USD 90 
billion in 2010 or almost 30% of GDP. To ease this unbearable burden for the budget and adjust 
incentives the government decided to increase prices for petroleum products and compensate lower 
income earners with cash subsidies. In December 2010, energy prices were increased substantially: 
diesel by 1,000%, gasoline by 400%, natural gas by over 700% and electricity by over 300%. In one 
year this resulted in energy subsidies being halved to USD 60 billion (15% of GDP as of December 
2011). 
At the same time, the government introduced a general cash transfer scheme (including for children) 
that amounted to USD 30 billion. However, the devaluation that leads to accelerated inflation has 
reduced the purchasing power of this monthly cash amount: around USD 45 per person at the end of 
2010 and only USD 12 in September 2012 with the actual exchange rates. Also, industries and other 
customers received USD 10-15 billion notably to carry out energy-saving investments. Also, as a 
result of these changes inflation increased from 10% in 2010 to 14% in 2011 but below the previsions. 
Since then, international sanctions further increased inflation above 25% in 2012 as it resulted in 
uncertainty and supply disruptions through the economy. However, the total cost of this mixed scheme 
(universal energy subsidies and cash transfer) appears to remain quite unchanged until the 
consumption pattern evolves to more rational levels. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of various subsidies by category of population revenues in Egypt (2004) 
 
Source: World Bank, 2005. 
Comments: It appears that net importers SEMCs have fewer price distortions and better cost recovery 
for electricity. However, they face the challenge of how to keep financing subsidies when oil prices 
are high and investment is needed to respond to the rapidly growing demand for energy, particularly 
electricity. 
Impacts  
Although perceived as a major component of the SEMCs social safety nets for the poor (by enhancing 
access to commercial energy), universal energy price subsidies have proven largely inefficient at 
reducing energy poverty; they actually provide benefits to other private and public sector customers. 
In particular, universal subsidies to LPG, gasoline and diesel do not significantly help poor households 
but offer benefit to the largest and wealthiest consumers of those fuels. Subsidies impose a heavy 
burden on government finances (especially in Egypt and Lebanon) aggravated by the 2008/2011 oil 
price surge as well as by economic and demographic growth. They also create substantial distortions 
in the region's economies. This growing pressure on state budgets appears unsustainable, in particular 
in Egypt and Lebanon. 
In SEMCs the fiscal burden of subsidies must be reduced to create more fiscal space for direct and 
targeted income support to the poor. Already, some governments, such as those in Jordan and Tunisia 
have progressively reduced the scope and level of price subsidies combined with EE&RE policies (e.g. 
Tunisian PROSOL: an effective solar water heater support scheme). 
2.2 Energy sector and its impact on socio-economic development 
While generally perceived as an important contribution to socio-economic development, the energy 
sector may also bring side effects and even generate a burden for the whole economy (curse effect). 
2.2.1 Energy sector’s socio-economic contributions  
2.2.1.1 The mechanisms at play – an overview 
A first level of the economic impacts of the energy sector is to consider the various inputs and 
interactions with other sectors. The analysis based on input-output tables confirms that forward 
linkages of the energy sector (in particular electricity, and gas, bundled together with water supply) are 
particularly large in both OECD and non-OECD countries (Paczynski, 2012). A forward linkage can 
be interpreted as a measure of the extent to which a given sector supplies inputs used by other sectors 
down the value chain. The energy sector is also strongly interconnected –i.e. it is trading production 
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inputs with many sectors, especially down the value chain. Energy-related investments can provide 
significant contribution to total investments. Employment effects of energy sector activity can be 
particularly significant through indirect channels - i.e. in other sectors cooperating or trading with the 
energy sector. Also, from a fiscal perspective, taxation of the energy sector is an important source of 
budget revenue.  
Beyond those standard interactions, as the size of the energy sector is usually substantial, ranging from 
2-3% to 10-15% of GDP20 in large energy exporting economies and requiring advanced technology 
(e.g. efficient oil refining, electricity generation and transmission) its quantitative and qualitative 
spillovers are often significant. Thus, it may create a dependency and become a source of cyclicality 
(notably through energy investments). 
The socio-economic impacts differ between sub-sectors and energy type. The centralised energy 
systems (e.g. oil and gas upstream and downstream, large-scale electricity generation) require sizeable 
up-front investment and highly qualified jobs in its design (R&D) and completion while then operation 
is less labour-intensive and does not require high skill level. The new and decentralised renewable 
energy systems (e.g. wind, PV, biomass and also energy efficiency) also require significant investment 
and R&D qualifications but more highly qualified jobs for the operation and maintenance. Various and 
converging studies have estimated that the EE&RE sectors create for each unit of energy supply 
between 5 to 7 more qualified jobs than the traditional energy sector and spread over the territories 
(EmployRES 2009; EREC and, 2009). 
The combination of advanced technology and demand for skilled jobs stimulates development of the 
education and training systems. Also the R&D impacts on research are significant due to the size of 
budgets engaged and multiplicating effects. A side effect may be a ‘brain drain’ towards the energy 
sector, especially the exporting hydrocarbon sub-sector (that can afford higher salaries), at the expense 
of other sectors. 
2.2.1.2 Situation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
In the SEMCs region, the size and weight of the domestic energy sectors is generally significant as 
illustrated by Morocco and Algeria – see the box below. This substantial share of the sector is 
exacerbated by the high cost of equipment, mostly imported, the growing energy demand and the 
relatively low GDP per capita. 
For instance, in Morocco, the energy sector (which mostly relies on energy imports) is the first 
industrial sector.21 Its important weight in the nation's economy can be described by:  
• Contribution to the GDP: 13%  
• Tax revenues: 9% of total (2010)  
• Investments: 9 billion dirhams (€ 0.8 billion) 22  
• Direct added-value (except induced activities): 27 billion dirhams of which electricity (57%) 
and refining (43%)  
• Manpower employed: approximately 30,000/40,000 (3.5/4% of total)  
• Main companies: ONE (electricity), AFRIQUIA (oil products) and TOTAL Maroc (oil 
products) that are ranked (based on total sales) as 4th, 6th and 8th largest country’s companies, 
respectively  
• Impact on transport and the port traffic: high (large imports of coal, oil and LPG)  
• Impact on regional development: important (energy activities covering the whole national 
territory). 
                                                     
20 In the US, oil and natural gas supply 63% of domestic energy, for total sales in the range of USD 1 trillion, 
4.4% of total added value and 6.6% of employment (PWC, 2008). 
21 2007 and 2010 data. 
22 Total increased significantly up to 2010 as only ONE annual investment amounted this year to 12.5 billion 
dirhams. 
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In Algeria, SONATRACH, the state-owned upstream oil and gas company, currently employs 120,000 
staff (1.5% of total labour force), has an annual turnover of USD 57 billion (2010), invests annually 
USD 16 billion, accounts for over 90% of country’s exports and 76% of total tax revenues in 2006 
(Bank of Algeria, 2008). In addition, it has a key impact on regional development. Its domination in 
Algeria’s economy and exports makes the company a major player with great influence beyond the 
sector. 
2.2.2 Energy sector’s subsidies 
2.2.2.1 The mechanisms at play – an overview 
As in the case of energy consumption subsidies, subsidies allocated to the energy sector intend to 
address market failures (support to development of nascent sectors/ technologies such as natural gas 
and renewables), driven mainly by environmental and energy-security concerns. Energy producer 
subsidies generally aim to stimulate or support new investments within the energy chain (production to 
distribution) and thus alleviate the high up-front investment costs and associated risks. Subsidy 
schemes to energy producers can also aim to reduce barriers to market entry (high cost of modern 
power generation as gas combined cycle and RE). Subsidies to a particular energy source or 
technology aim to stimulate investment (also in R&D). Energy producer subsidies can also aim to 
protect employment when compensating economic losses. Subsidies can also combine various 
objectives simultaneously such as increase energy security, protect jobs and domestic energy 
industries, support regional development and reduce pollution. Energy producer subsidies support 
capacity and/or output according to the type of fuels or technologies. 
‘Take-off subsidy’ to prepare working playing field for new technologies or energies appears 
necessary to attract initial investment and limit the associated risks, provided its conditions are 
fulfilled (including transparent scheme, cost effective with tax return, limited in time). Also, certain 
types of subsidies can effectively promote the development and use of less environmentally harmful 
technologies and fuels, such as energy efficiency and renewables (UNEP, 2008). 
Globally, producer subsidies account for a smaller share of GDP than those to energy consumption, 
but their economic impacts can also be significant – either positively or negatively. In practice, 
subsidies to energy companies often go to large capital-intensive projects, such as hydropower dams, 
large-scale thermal power plants and oil refineries (UNEP, 2008). However, the combination of 
significant investment subsidies and high capital needs channelled for energy investments may 
generate internal and external unbalances. Primarily, this may divert long-term financial resources at 
the expense of other priority investment such as education and health. A World Bank report concluded 
that “subsidies to the large commercial businesses that dominate the energy sector or to industries that 
provide services mostly to better-off households” are not justified (Barnes and Halpern, 2000). 
Subsidies to energy producers can harm economic efficiency in the following ways: 
• Subsidies may isolate companies from competitive market pressures and thus reduce incentives 
to minimise costs and increase service quality, resulting in less investment in more efficient 
technology, insufficient maintenance and thus less energy- and economically-efficient systems;  
• Direct subsidies (e.g. grants, tax exemptions, soft loans) without cap can drain public budgets, 
especially with high international prices, and generate windfall profits. This translates into 
lower tax collection and/or debt; 
• Subsidies to specific energy technologies or fuels may affect the development and 
commercialisation of alternatives that might ultimately become more economically (as well as 
environmentally) attractive. 
Subsidies (through soft loans, new transport networks) to some major facilities, such as hydropower 
dams usually displace communities at high social cost, although a greater access to electricity and 
water for irrigation can bring significant social benefits as well. Nevertheless, a global balance of costs 
and benefits is rarely undertaken during the feasibility and impact studies. Energy subsidies should 
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encourage access to the modern energy sources, not to cover operating costs of companies and to 
capital intensive projects (World Resource Institute study, 2004). 
2.2.2.2 Situation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
The rapidly increasing energy consumption in SEMCs has clearly led governments to allocate growing 
resources to new supply capacities requested by energy companies. The administrated tariffs appear 
too low for companies to raise capital, turning to the state for subsidies and banks for concessional 
loans subsidised by the government and/or international donors. Also, the combined pressure of 
energy companies and equipment suppliers on relatively weak public administration prevents  study of 
the economic viability of those investment plans and alternatives such as: i) demand-side measures 
which prove cheaper per unit of energy, more effective and durable; ii) local, small-scale labour-
intensive energy facilities, such as biomass digesters, CHP and solar water heaters (SWH). IFIs have 
aggravated these distortions by providing loans to build new large and centralised facilities. 
2.2.3 Energy exports and revenues: a blessing or a curse? 
2.2.3.1 The mechanisms at play – an overview 
Commodity exports, in particular of hydrocarbons, can generate significant export revenues. Also, the 
oil market is global and liquid enough to enable oil exporters to find buyers and markets relatively 
easily (also depending on crude qualities). Crude oil and oil products make up around 14% of the 
world’s commodity trade – much more than all other commodities. This high share is maintained 
despite the relatively low value added of oil, but is boosted by higher oil prices.23  
For natural gas, initial exports by pipelines and long-term supply contracts restricted sales to selected 
markets. Since the 1990s, the spectacular development of LNG (using special tankers) and its growing 
share traded on the spot market (LNG tankers can supply a wide range of sea terminals) has brought it 
closer to a global market. 
In absolute terms, the spectacular surge of revenues from oil and gas exports has further increased 
their share in trade balances and state budgets of oil and gas-rich countries. The oil and gas industries 
are considered as cornerstones of respective national economies as they ensure their export revenues, 
employment and technology development. Moreover, the prevailing views in the 1950s and 1960s,  
somehow revived in the 1990s, is that increases of income per capita would lead to socio-economic 
improvements.  
However, large hydrocarbon revenues have also proven to generate negative side effects in emerging 
economies that can hamper their growth. Oil and gas export revenues generate structural imbalances 
called as the resource curse, Dutch disease24 or ‘oil syndrome’ (African Economic Research 
Consortium, 2007; Ross, 2010) including: 
• Revenues and debt: the linear anticipation of future export revenues often creates the illusion of 
financial solidness and leads to the excessive use of sovereign debt (by government and state 
companies). High nominal oil revenues also create an illusion of wealth but the absence of 
macroeconomic framework and strategy and inter-sector interactions generally fails to generate 
a virtuous circle. This can lead to the political use of revenues for short-term and narrow 
objectives, e.g., increased employment in public administration, higher salaries in the public 
sector, the import of luxury goods and military hardware. At the same time, investments on 
infrastructure and structural development (e.g. education, health) lag behind the demand for 
them leading to various bottlenecks and distortions. Historical experience shows that increasing 
public spending without a strong development strategy does not lead per se to higher and 
                                                     
23 In January 1999: around USD 10 a barrel, June 2008: a peak at USD 145, early 2012: above USD 100. 
24 Following the Netherlands’ large natural gas discoveries and exports in the early 1960’s, wealth increased 
dramatically and raised the value of the Dutch currency by 30%. As a result, competitiveness, especially of the 
manufacturing sector dropped, inflation rose and unemployment shot up. 
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sustained growth and effective socio-economic development, and thus to poverty reduction. On 
the other hand, fiscal expansion followed by reduction of oil revenues (as result of decline in oil 
prices) may lead to abrupt cyclicality that weakens poverty reduction policies.  
• Monetary imbalances: the inflows of foreign currency revenues and subsequent appreciation of 
the national currency25 harms the competitiveness of other exports (of low and intermediate 
technology levels). Also, excessive inflow of oil revenues pushes central banks to raise interest 
rates to curb inflation, but this discourages non-commodity sectors from investing. Large 
financial flows can also generate financial and real bubbles, in particular, real estate ones. Such 
financial imbalances are at the core of ‘Dutch disease’.  
• Dependency and volatility: the high share of hydrocarbons in total exports and fiscal revenues 
creates a structural dependency, which prevents diversification and creates structural imbalances 
that are aggravated by commodity price cycles. 
• Financial management and investment: in a rent-seeking economy, the capacity to manage 
exploitation of resources in a timely manner and spend resource-related revenues in a 
productive way is a serious political challenge. High and potentially unsustainable revenue 
flows (as not linked to a domestic productive sector) need to be channelled, notably to avoid 
financial and real bubbles and the potential ravages of Dutch disease. Imported inflation and 
speculation on rare goods and services increase domestic prices and even create rationing that 
harm other business competitiveness and household revenues. A country may either accumulate 
more foreign reserves (often in the form of long-term ‘oil funds’), or increase spending. If the 
decision is to spend, is it better in consumption or investment? Empirical evidence suggests that 
in most cases resource rents fail to reach domestic sectors and generate balanced and sustained 
growth. This is also due to limited sectoral synergies: oil rents do not easily spread to domestic 
manufacturing industries.  
• Trade imbalances: a trade surplus hides a structural imbalance as hydrocarbon export countries 
sell low value-added raw materials but import advanced technology equipment, consuming 
goods and services. Thus, the terms of trade are clearly unfavourable and deteriorate over time. 
Domestically, the low oil and gas added value combines generally with low employment 
(skilled jobs being filled in by foreign expatriates) and limited technology transfers. Also, oil 
and gas prices are fixed on international markets under the influence of powerful integrated oil 
oligopolies the ‘majors’ or ‘Seven Sisters’ – that initially controlled most of world hydrocarbon 
supplies and subject to financial interests and speculation. Oil prices are therefore not 
transparent; they are also highly volatile, a situation exacerbated by the currency volatility 
(USD, EUR) prompted by hidden devaluations. Furthermore, most of the added value along the 
oil supply chain is realised downstream (cf. OPEC ratios on the oil value share). This also 
relates to frequent abuses of terms of exploitation of resources and sharing revenues and tax 
contributions by oil companies (e.g., using offshore tax heavens to reduce taxes in exporting and 
importing countries). This role of international oil companies may explain part of these 
imbalances. But, if the big companies were mainly to blame for the oil syndrome, then 
nationalisation should have cleared this issue. However, the 1970s nationalisation by various oil 
countries actually made the problems worse. 
• Governance: another challenge is related to transparency in public governance and revenue 
management in the context of government secrecy in respect to oil revenues. The Revenue 
Management for Extractive Industries (EIR, World Bank led-initiative) (EIR, 2003) identifies 
11 obstacles to  adequate governance: “1) lack of participatory democracy; 2) corruption, lack 
of transparency and accountability; 3) excessive military and security expenditure; 4) lack of 
capacity for long-term planning and monitoring; 5) insensitivity to in-country context; 6) lack of 
                                                     
25 Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the conversion of foreign currencies into local currency increases money 
supply and, consequently, leading to higher domestic prices and real appreciation of the national currency. Under 
the flexible exchange rate, real appreciation follows on from nominal appreciation.  
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good fiscal and macroframework, poor revenue management; 7) lack of community access to 
benefits; 8) foreign investment dominance and lack of local domestic enterprises; 9) weak legal 
system; 10) insufficient technical capability; and 11) poor communication capacity and 
resources”. Almost all oil export countries share weak institutions and low governance 
indicators. For instance, African oil exporters are characterised by weak rule of law, 
malfunctioning bureaucracy and a democracy deficit, with a negative impact on the economy. 
Also, poor corporate governance in state-owned energy companies is detrimental to their 
performance. They often interfere in public policies and decisions, owing to their economic and 
political weight. 
Overall, the combination of those negative economic, financial, governance, social and environmental 
effects has been experienced by almost all commodity exporters and led to a paradoxical reduction of 
the GDP per capita over time. Among 65 countries with large natural resources, only four (Botswana, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) managed to reach both: (a) long-term investment exceeding 25% of 
GDP on average from 1970 to 1998 and (b) per capita GDP average annual growth above 4% over the 
same period. As an illustration, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) as a whole 
experienced a negative rate of GDP per capita growth (Gylfason, 2001; Nili, 2003) over a similar 
period. Among its members, Venezuela ranked among the ten richest nations at the beginning of the 
19th century and then as a wealthy country during the 1970s. However, despite its important oil 
exports, it is downgraded to the level of a middle-income country (GDP per capita: 65th out of 184, 
2010). Similarly, Nigeria’s GDP per capita of USD 400 is far below the low-income countries’ 
average, despite USD 300 billion of oil revenues for over 25 years.  
Furthermore, according to UNDP Human Development Index, the living standards in most oil and gas 
producers (Nigeria ranked 156th out of 187 and Venezuela ranked 73th) (UNDP, 2010) are similar or 
lower as the poorest countries of sub-Saharan Africa. These findings indicate that large oil revenues do 
not necessarily lead to economic growth and development but, on the contrary, to sub-development. 
Overall, rent-seeking strategies appear detrimental to economic growth and lock economies and public 
budgets into dependency on a single sector and one commodity market (Ross, 2010). This is the so-
called ‘paradox of plenty’ where natural resources fail to generate sustainable benefits and, on the 
contrary, lock economies into vicious circles and create various economic, financial, social and 
environmental distortions.  
These structural and complex issues are generally imbricated and thus difficult to address separately 
without a global and sustained politically supported reform plan. They require ambitious policies for 
hydrocarbon export economies to create the conditions of sustained and balanced growth (see Part 3 
below). 
2.2.3.2 Situation in the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
The SEMCs economies that rely extensively on hydrocarbon exports (Algeria, Libya and, to certain 
extent, Egypt) also face the oil curse effect. Their poverty is widespread and economic growth slow, 
despite an abundance of extractive resources. An illustrative case of the oil syndrome/paradox is 
Algeria (see box below). 
Box 3. Oil paradox in Algeria 
According to various studies (e.g. Benabdellah, 2010), the Algerian economy presents all the symptoms 
of oil syndrome and of the Dutch disease, but not its main mechanisms. It indeed presents a sectoral 
characteristic26 of the oil syndrome:  
• A vigorous growth of the hydrocarbon sector, which mobilised investments worth of USD 21 
billion between 2000 and 2005 and then USD 32 billion between 2005 and 2009 (or 20% and 22% 
                                                     
26 For more details and extensive analysis and data, see MEDPRO Technical Report No. 7 “Algeria’s failed 
transitions to a sustainable polity: Coming to yet another crossroads”, Hakim Darbouche, 2011. 
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of the GDP, respectively) and accounts for 97% of total exports;  
• A strong growth of the service sector, in particular public works (thanks to large public 
investment programmes) and commercial services (both with relatively low labour-intensity);  
• A decline of the industrial manufacturing;  
• A structural inflation and speculative bubbles;  
• Hydrocarbons account for almost 50% of GDP and public spending represents above two-thirds of 
GDP. 
The economy tends towards the oil syndrome, however, without the transmission channels of the Dutch 
disease. Indeed, the oil boom in Algeria that occurred since 1999 did not overvalue the national 
currency. The real effective exchange rate (REER), the main transmission channel of the Dutch disease 
depreciated by approximately 20% since 2000. 
This is because the Bank of Algeria sterilises part of international reserves by recycling them on the 
international financial markets27. Stabilisation of the REER constitutes a key objective of country’s 
economic policy. As result, the Bank of Algeria has accumulated USD 170 billion of international 
reserves in 2011; an amount equal to the country’s GDP. Depreciation of the dinar (with the market rate 
up to 40% lower than the official rate) is also a result of the relatively poor economic performance of 
Algeria, its economic and political uncertainties and high spontaneous dollarisation. Furthermore, 
Algeria suffers from capital flight, which was estimated by the Global Finances Integrity (GFI)28) to be 
at least USD 26 billion over the period 1970-2008. 
Actually, Algeria’s macro-economic performance (GDP annual average growth of 3.7% and real GDP 
per head increase by 22% over 2000-2009, annual inflation at 4-5%)  –, a spectacular reduction of the 
sovereign debt (repayment of USD 25 billion) and) is not reflected in the standard of living and the 
access of most of the population to basic services (education, health, housing and even energy, in 
particular electricity subjected to chronic cuts) and to employment (even if official unemployment rate 
decreased from around 30% in early 2000s to 10% but it is estimated to be at least 15% and is chronic 
for  youth labour force (30%), in particular,  young graduates (40%) with a high share of temporary and 
precarious jobs. In fact, approximately one Algerian in four lives below the poverty line and the rate of 
illiteracy exceeds 22%, whereas inequality of income has increased (20% of the population holds over 
50% of the total wealth). Actually, Algeria ranks 94th in the UNDP Human Development Index (2010).  
Furthermore, according to GFI (2011), Algeria faces various governance problems, including leaking of 
oil revenues to financial offshore centres, overspending in security and defence and lack of budgetary 
transparency and accountability. Using the hydrocarbon revenue, in 2001 the government launched a 
large public investment programme (2001-2009: USD 200 billion and 2010–14: over USD 280 billion) 
focused on infrastructure and access to public services (housing, water, education, energy and health). 
Nevertheless, “while the transformative impact of these efforts on the economy has been palpable, their 
effect on the long-term prospects for growth and sustainability is less certain” (MEDPRO/Darbouche H., 
2011). The public investment programmes appear not yet integrated in a long-term economic 
development strategy, in particular to diversify the economy and reduce its dependence and vulnerability 
on a single sector and commodity market. Therefore, “the risk of being thrown back into a severe socio-
economic crisis is as real today as it was 25 years ago, when a prolonged period of depressed oil prices 
had dramatic consequences for Algeria” (MEDPRO /Darbouche, 2011).  
 
                                                     
27 Algeria also established an oil fund, the Arab Oil Fund that was administered by the African Development 
Bank until its funds were fully disbursed. 
28 According to GFI (GFI, 2011), the capital flight from Africa amounted to USD 854 billion between 1970 and 
2008, or four times the total amount of foreign debt of the continent In case of Egypt it amounted to USD 70.5 
billion, in Libya - to USD 43 billion, in Morocco - to USD 25 billion, in Tunisia - 16 billion USD and in Syria - 
23 billion USD.  
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3. Scenario and policy approach for integrated socio-economic 
development and energy/climate policies in SEMCs 
Introduction 
Based on historical analysis, international experience and best practices, SEMCs need to take a global 
and cross-sectoral view. Their public policies must address current deep and accumulating socio-
economic difficulties and negative vicious interactions between socio-economic processes and energy, 
and be well structured and systemic to overcome such challenges. An integrated approach to the 
SEMCs energy sector should rely on two main pillars: i) socio-economic reforms; ii) integrated energy 
policy.  
3.1 Socio-economic reforms to build the fundamentals 
To overcome existing problems and distortions such as an excessive energy burden, massive subsidies 
or the oil syndrome, SEMCs need to undertake thorough and sustained socio-economic reforms, 
backed by solid strategies. Those strategies would need to be supported and incorporated into laws, 
regulations, and contractual obligations to structure and articulate the reform process. Such reforms 
would first need to build a solid socio-economic framework that has proved essential in other regions 
(Central Europe and the Baltic States in the 1990s) and Tunisia and Jordan, which are among the most 
advanced countries in the southern Mediterranean region. The reform priorities should include: 
a) Building strong institutional national capacities (in expertise and adequate staff numbers) 
within a robust set-up (national economic and social ministries and their agencies, including a 
statistical office). Coordination between SEMCs’ national institutions, but also with regional 
and local institutions, is crucial. 
b) Developing a solid socio-economic statistical system (including database and indicators) and 
economic tools (e.g. projections and forecast) in line with international standards (Eurostat and 
UN) to form a transversal and multi-sectoral information system (including ‘dash board’ 
indicators) to assist SEMCs’ policy design, evaluation and investment decisions. 
c) Designing, implementing and monitoring multi-sectoral development strategy with medium 
to long-term vision. The strategy priorities (notably, poverty reduction and infrastructure 
development) should need to be based on a detailed diagnostic, allowing identifying global and 
sectoral priorities (in particular promising sectors as those related to the ‘green’ economy)29, 
qualitative and quantitative objectives (with related indicators), timetable and clear 
responsibilities of implementation. The design and evaluation process would also include an 
open and true dialogue and consultation with key stakeholders and civil society (think tanks and 
NGOs) to ensure ownership and feedback on the strategy. Such national development strategy 
would serve as the reference for all socio-economic public policies. It would also need to be 
regularly monitored and evaluated.  
d) Improved governance: Comprehensive national strategies backed by strong political will and 
capacity building can become powerful tools to enhance both SEMCs’ public administration as 
well as corporate governance of state companies. For both entities, the objectives include 
ensuring accountability to political/public authorities and the public/clients. The adoption and 
introduction of clear standards and procedures would reinforce management capacities and 
social dialogue. Independent evaluations would regularly assess progress and fields for 
improvements. Also, the enforcement of the rule of law by an independent judiciary appears as 
a cornerstone reform in this process. Specific anti-bribery action plans can complement the 
approach on this key item.  
                                                     
29 Jordan and Morocco already adopted green economy strategies: “Towards a Green Economy in Jordan”, 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=678&menu=35; “Mobilisation pour 
une croissance verte au Maroc”, (www.mem.gov.ma/publucations/mobilisationourunecroissanceverte.pdf 
www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/advisory_services/countries/Morocco%20final.pdf).   
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e) Oil revenue management  
The hydrocarbon exports generate substantial risks and imbalances that need to be managed and 
mitigated by SEMCs’ governments. Besides, economic policies would need to ensure that their 
benefits contribute to the sustainable development of the human, social and physical capital. 
The management of oil revenues would need to combine strict governance standards and macro-
economic tools in line with multi-sectoral socio-economic development strategy. To improve the oil 
revenue management and enhance population welfare and quality of life the following actions are 
critical: 
1. Ensure transparency of oil revenues and their disposition; this includes lifting governmental 
secrecy on the revenues (possibly using the support of technical assistance and experience of 
other countries subscribing to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative-EITI). An 
independent oil fund has proven to be an effective tool to manage oil revenues and ensure that 
their allocation corresponds to the decisions that are open to public disclosure. 
2. Based on the economic development strategy, and in consultation with principal stakeholders, 
clear and flexible rules should guide allocation of oil revenues. The main short-term objective 
would aim to prevent the Dutch disease thanks to respective monetary and fiscal policies 
(following the experience of Algeria). In the medium- to long-term, oil revenues should support 
economic diversification, investments in public services (education, health), R&D, public 
infrastructure (telecom, transport, energy) and poverty reduction. Such investments should 
generate positive effects, in particular, increasing competitiveness of the entire economy. 
3. The challenge is both to reduce corruption and rent-seeking activities, to enable oil rents support 
economic growth and social development through productive investment. Also, it could help to 
progressively move away from a strong dependence on non-renewable, low-added value and 
volatile resources to a more diversified and competitive industrial model.  
A good practice was developed by Chile, which has addressed the key challenge of managing large 
revenue inflows following commodity windfalls (copper prices in the late 1980s, early 1990s and 
since 2008). In particular, the government imposed a tax on ‘hot’ money inflows ('encaje’ mechanism) 
while welcoming longer-term diversification of investment, promoted by a strong national economic 
development strategy. 
f) Poverty reduction strategy- the reforms of commodity subsidies 
Maintaining the current energy subsidy systems in the SEMCs seems fiscally and economically 
unsustainable, especially after the increase of international commodity prices in recent years. In 
addition, they appear largely inefficient at reducing poverty. Thus, in oil exporting and importing 
countries, the effective reduction of poverty depends on adoption of comprehensive national poverty 
reduction strategies. Nonetheless, experiences in the region indicate that the social consequences of 
the subsidy reforms can have far-reaching political implications, for example, public unrest. Thus, 
policy-makers need to take into account both economic and social constraints (including transaction 
costs) and the potential political consequences.  
Based on detailed data collection and qualitative poverty assessment on a broad range of items, 
specific tools such as social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) can evaluate the impacts of various 
subsidies (and alternatives) on social welfare and their effectiveness. Such diagnostic serves to identify 
priorities and develop direct and individual poverty reduction schemes based on reliable database of 
poor households. 
Direct support, in the form of direct income transfers and lifeline tariffs (special low rates for small 
and poor users) for water, electricity and gas (instead of individualised vouchers)30 can individually 
support the neediest SEMCs customers for selected products (food, energy). The effectiveness of 
                                                     
30 Vouchers provide insufficient price signal to customers and, thus reduce incentives (such as to save energy 
and use it more efficiently).  
32 | EMMANUEL BERGASSE, WITH WOJCIECH PACZYNSKI, MAREK DABROWSKI & LUC DEWULF 
 
lifeline tariffs31 depends on the targeted population being connected to the distribution networks and 
the possibility to collect data on each household’s consumption. 
As outlined by various studies and best practices, direct support has proved to be more effective at 
reducing the loss in real income due to higher commodity prices than universal price subsidies and 
cross-subsidies. Besides, such well-targeted direct safety nets are more cost-effective, thus reducing 
the burden on government finances (it also becomes possible to increase the level of support to poorer 
households while reducing the global envelope) and have more durable effects. Its monitoring and 
evaluation are also easier. They have also the advantage of involving in persona the households, 
enhancing the ownership and establishing a channel of information and advice on related topics 
(education, health). It means that social policy moves from primary reliance on in-kind subsidies to 
cash transfers, provided that governance is improved to avoid misuses.  
Such safety nets require an extensive data collection notably to develop a reliable database of poor 
households and individual administrative follow-up that may be carried out by a specific public 
agency (Jordan National Aid Fund) and /or local recognised NGOs. For energy support, short-term 
support can also be complemented by structural measures such as basic energy efficiency (e.g. flat 
insulation, low consumption Class A appliances) that reduce at  source the level of consumption (with 
rapid payback at market prices) and thus the cash subsidy. In parallel, a progressive and scheduled 
phasing out of the inefficient universal price subsidies and cross-subsidies complements the subsidy 
reform. It could have direct positive economic effects, particularly if it significantly reduces economic 
distortions with market price signals and budget deficits. A global IMF study backed by country 
experiences (e.g. Jordan) concluded that keeping energy prices liberalised is a robust approach to 
prevent a resurgence of universal subsidies (IMF, 2011).  
Overall, balanced reformed subsidy schemes should be: 
• Soundly based: direct subsidies should be justified by a thorough study of the associated costs 
and benefits. Also, they should not conflict with other instruments and goals; 
• Well-targeted: direct support should be directed and limited to a clearly defined group within 
the most vulnerable on an individual basis; 
• Practical: the overall amount of a subsidy should be affordable for the state budget and the 
administrative cost transparent and reasonable; 
• Transparent: information on the total subsidy funds and target groups should be disclosed; 
• Limited in time with regular evaluations to avoid consumers and producers becoming overly 
dependent on this support, to limit opportunist behaviours and avoid costs spiralling out of 
control. 
Direct income support has proved to be more effective than universal price subsidies and cross-
subsidies. Besides, well-targeted direct safety nets are less costly and easier to evaluate. The reform in 
Jordan proved it can be both feasible and effective. However, the current political turmoil in the region 
makes it politically and socially difficult to pursue such reforms. For example, the government of 
Jordan decided to return to the subsidisation of fuel prices in 2011. 
3.2 Integrated energy/climate policy 
The integrated energy policy in SEMCs should include at least two components:  
a) National energy strategy 
o Each SEMC would benefit from a comprehensive and long-term national energy 
strategy remaining in synergy with other public policies (climate, transport, regional, 
social, etc.) and coherence with other countries’ strategies.  
                                                     
31 The example of Cape Town (South Africa): below 450 kWh of electricity per month, the first 50 kWh are free 
of charge, a social tariff applies for the next 100 kWh and above 150 and then 350 kWh the tariff successively 
increase by 32% (www.scenicsouth.co.za/2011/07/city-of-cape-town-electricity-tariff-structure-1-july-2011/). 
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o The strategy may rely on at least three pillars (WWF, 2010; IEA, 2008): 
 Energy security and access: there is  significant potential   to diversify fuels, 
sources and suppliers; put in place emergency crisis management (combination of 
contingency plans and oil stocks); finalise rural electrification and promote 
sustainable biomass; increase access to energy services for the poor, notably 
through social tariffs for electricity and LPG (when relevant) for poor households 
combined with an incentive scheme for A or A+ class energy equipment and basic 
insulation of buildings. 
 Structural and regulatory reforms: within a clear, effective and stable legislative 
and regulatory energy framework, independent regulators should progressively set 
tariffs based on cost-recovery level, in parallel with the improvement in security 
and quality of supply. Anyhow, phasing out of universal price subsidies and cross-
subsidies would need to be gradual with clear time horizons (e.g. annual 5% price 
adjustment over a 5-10 years period) and complemented by an individual support 
system combining lifeline/social tariffs and targeted subsidies to the poorest parts 
of the population. The pricing policy should aim to both enable the poor to access 
energy services (with eventual individual support) and have energy tariffs that 
reflect its real costs (including investment and maintenance, and progressively, 
externalities, for example, health and environmental expenses). 
 Energy sector restructuring: SEMCs’ governments face the challenge of 
improving corporate governance in energy monopolies and their accountability to 
public authorities and clients, move natural monopoly functions to special state-
owned entities (e.g. transmission system operator (TSO) owning and operating the 
electric and gas grids) and lift technical barriers (e.g. national grid bottlenecks to 
connect planned RE capacity and interconnections). 
o A crucial reform relates to separating the function of public policy from 
regulation and policy enforcement, and management of the public energy 
sector. This would limit conflicts of interest and political interference in 
energy sector operations.  
o Developing a reliable statistical system on energy (in particular, energy 
balances, price database and indicators as developed within MEDSTAT) and 
economic tools (e.g. demand forecast, least-cost plan) in line with 
international standards and in synergy with a national data system. 
Once those crucial reforms are in place, sustainable energy policies can develop, as in Tunisia 
since the mid-1980s. Indeed, with a more balanced regulatory framework and cost-recovery 
prices, energy efficiency and renewable energy can become more attractive for private and 
public investment.  
b) Sustainable energy policy  
Better energy efficiency (EE) in combination with an increased use of renewable energy (RE) 
sources can remove some of the structural barriers of the SEMCs’ energy sectors and move 
away from excessive dependence on fossil fuels and diversify supply.  
The first priority in the SEMCs is to enhance the efficient use of energy, which offers large and 
affordable potential (cf. MEDPRO paper MEDPRO/Blanc F., 2012). Along the energy chain, 
the efficiency of energy supply and use can be improved by about 30% as demonstrated by 
comprehensive studies carried out in Tunisia (ANME, 2006; Plan Bleu, 2007) and the average 
performance of industrialised countries. This can be achieved by using the most efficient 
technologies already available. They are less expensive per unit of energy than increasing 
energy supply, environmental impact notwithstanding. Energy efficiency is a cost-effective tool 
to reduce high energy intensities and waste, and thus consumer energy bills. It also helps to 
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control energy demand; demand and supply of energy needs to be better integrated to better 
satisfy customer needs (not only supplier interests). 
Furthermore, EE&RE generate more and higher skilled jobs than fossil and nuclear energy 
(EmployRES 2009; EREC and, 2009). Decentralisation of energy sources offers economic 
benefits and increases security of supply as well as reduces investment in large transmission 
capacities. 
Based on disaggregated sectoral data on energy consumption, the strategy could identify energy 
saving potential by sector/sub-sector and rank them by priority (by cost and saving potential) 
and then propose concrete measures (behavioural changes and investments). 
These measures and associated targets need to be packaged in detailed national sustainable 
energy (EE&RE) action plans. The smart design and effective implementation of these plans 
depends on the strength of public institutions (energy ministries and agencies) and their human 
capacity. 
Improved energy end-use efficiency and increased use of renewable sources of energy can ease 
energy demand and supply tensions and contribute to economic and social development. To 
stimulate better use of energy and of renewable energy (in particular solar technologies) a key 
measure is to set a clear and stable regulatory framework, including transparent permits 
procedures, non-discriminatory and open grid access and effective RE support schemes. 
Sustainable energy policy is naturally interlinked with the environmental policy, in particular 
with mitigation of air water and soil pollution and emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). In 
addition, carbon financing (CDM) can play a role in the co-financing of EE&RE investment 
projects (generally up to 10% of total costs). 
3.3 Regional energy cooperation: initiatives and challenges 
While national reforms and integrated energy strategies are essential to overcome SEMCs’ difficulties, 
they are not sufficient to tackle international and cross-border issues, e.g. bilateral and regional 
electricity and gas interconnections. 
Thus, both intra-Med and EU-MED energy cooperation appears crucial to build regional/sub-regional 
infrastructure (e.g. power and gas interconnections within the Maghreb and with the EU) and market 
(e.g. Maghreb electricity market). Both joint infrastructure and regional markets can offer:  
• Economies of scale on investment and serving a large regional market;  
• Higher security of supply (through interconnections); 
• Access to the least costly and most diversified supplies as well as export markets, in particular 
the potential to export renewable electricity to the EU (as per the EU Renewable Directive.32) 
Plans and ambitions of the MSP 
The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) launched in 2008 within the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) 
has the objective to foster and catalyse both EU and SEM efforts. Indeed, the highly ambitious 
investment under the MSP initiative aims to introduce 20 GW generation capacity from renewable 
energy by 2020. It aims to act as a catalyst for reforms and joint EU and SEMCs’ investment. It is 
backed by two other major pan-regional initiatives: 
• Medgrid (ex-TRANSGREEN) made up of major TSOs and utilities33 with ambitions to develop 
regional electric interconnection lines, in particular to export renewable electricity from the 
south to the north of the Mediterranean.  
                                                     
32 The Directive 2009/18/EC (Art. 9) provides the possibility to import significant volumes of renewable 
electricity (REL) from third countries in the coming decade. It enables EU Member States (MS) to import 
renewable electricity from outside the EU and to incorporate it into their RE target for 2020, something that 
remains challenging for several MS). 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENERGY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTHERN MED | 35 
 
• DESERTEC, a strong private-led investment initiative, bringing together large multinational 
energy groups34 and aiming to build a network of renewable electricity projects in MPCs (in the 
range of 20 GW for an estimated total investment of €30 billion, and up to 80 billion with 
infrastructure costs35), mostly solar electricity projects for the EU electricity markets. 
DESERTEC already signed framework agreements with Tunisia36 and Algeria.  
In May 2012 in Rome (Italy), the Electricity Transmission System Operators of the northern and 
southern rims of the region established Med-TSO, a cooperation platform of Mediterranean 
transmission system operators. Med-TSO’s main objectives are to “coordinating the development 
plans and the operation of the grids in MED-TSO countries, encouraging the integration of their 
electricity systems and the implementation of common criteria and harmonised, transparent and non-
discriminatory rules of access to and usage of grids”37. 
Towards a more integrated and balanced MSP and EuroMed energy cooperation 
The MSP, by putting high political priority on sustainable energy and setting ambitious targets to 
2020, has already proved useful to generate broad policy discussions and new initiatives. Its focused 
and transversal approach, with political support, has the potential to further advance the reform 
agenda38, something that is needed in most MPCs to make effective large EE&RE investment.  
Nevertheless, the MSP’s advancement has been slow up to now (as of October 2010 only 0.2 GW are 
effectively under implementation or 1%)39, as investing in large RE electricity projects in this region 
remains complex and risky for investors. Even if its full, MSP contribution would be marginal (5% of 
total capacity and even less of electricity consumption, impelled by a rapid and hard-to control energy 
increase)40. This is also much less than the large planned coal and gas power plant projects (almost 20 
GW after +64 GW for the period 2000-2005) that are expected to reach 240 GW by 2020 (multiplied 
by 3.5 over 2005 to 2020), or two-thirds of the total at this horizon.41 Also, the MSP targets mostly 
electricity despite the large solar water heater and biomass (as biogas, agriculture waste) potential and 
does not fully include Turkey, despite its large wind and solar potential.  
The projected interconnections by Medgrid between SEMCs and between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean should be designed and used to effectively exchange renewable electricity, not to 
import poorly-regulated fossil and nuclear power generation (e.g. coal and gas power plants in Tunisia 
and Morocco planned by some EU utilities to use future ‘green’ electric interconnections to export to 
Spain and Italy), furthermore outside the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS). Apart from 
destabilising partner energy systems, this will create unfair competition (even dumping) for EU 
                                                                                                                                                                     
33 Abengoa, AFD, Alstom, Areva, AtosOrigin, CDC infrastructure, EDF, Nexans, Prysmian, RED Eléctrica de 
España, RTE, Siemens, Taqa Arabia-(www.medgrid-psm.com). 
34 Including Munich Re, Deutsche Bank, Siemens, ABB, E.ON, RWE, Abengoa Solar, Cevital, HSH Nordbank, 
M & W Zander Holding, MAN Solar Millennium, and Schott Solar (www.desertec.org). 
35 Other estimates at the 2050 horizon indicate € 400 billion- (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Desertec#cite_note-
epoch-10). 
36 Pre-feasibility studies for pilot projects worth 500 MW: 250 MW CSP plants, 125 MW photovoltaic and 125 
MW wind. 
37See (http://setis.ec.europa.eu/newsroom-items-folder/european-commissions-launches-med-tso-to-boost-
mediterranean-electricity-systems-2). 
38 “Heliosthana, a Mediterranean sustainable energy country”; WWF/HBF; May 2010; ‘EuroMed Energy 
Cooperation & the Mediterranean Solar Plan: A unique opportunity for a fresh start in a new era?” Bergasse E.; 
CIDOB, Barcelona, July 2011. 
39 “Study on the Financing of Renewable Energy Investment in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
Region”, FEMIP/EIB; October 2010. 
40 In the context of weak or non-fully operational EE policies and institutions. 
41 OME, 2008 and MEDPRO WP 4b indicate a lower increase of total capacity at 200 GW by 2020 with a higher 
share of renewables (26%, of which 14% for hydropower and 12% for other renewables (wind accounting for 
almost 8%). 
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renewable and fossil electricity producers. Also, it appears crucial to ensure a fair playing field 
between investors and between SEMCs, minimum coordination between DESERTEC and Medgrid, 
and convergence within the MSP. 
Thus, the forthcoming Master Plan of the MSP (to be adopted by early 2013), within the EuroMed 
energy cooperation (and its current and future regional action plan) would benefit from introducing 
various changes:  
• Revising its quantitative objectives by:  
o Taking into account Turkey’s EE&RE potential (estimated at 23 GW, only for wind); 
o Incorporating heat (solar thermal) and biomass (biogas, agriculture waste) into RE 
potential; 
o Revise the ‘20 GW’ objective in terms of available renewable electricity (in GWh) which 
can be delivered to the grid; 
o Expressing the energy efficiency objective in negaWatts (in nGW) and saved electricity 
(in nGWh); 
o Setting post-2020 renewable energy and negaWatts targets. 
• Amending the solar plans with clear and detailed implementation timetable backed by robust 
market reforms to progressively reach market fundamentals.  
• Giving a priority to EE (in particular standards and labels) the most effective and cost-effective 
tool to control energy demand and satisfy needs with RE. 
• Adding an action plan for rehabilitation and modernisation of national grids and 
interconnections (they are largely outdated and weak while RE requires strong grid capacity and 
reactivity). 
• Better use of MPC expertise on EE&RE; propagate regional and national best practices. 
• Reinforcing regional cooperation on energy statistics within MEDSTAT42 (the EuropeAid 
regional capacity building programme on statistics) especially on data collection, energy 
balances and indicators, according to Eurostat and IEA standards. 
• Promoting regional partnership on related R&D, academic activity and manufacturing. 
The forthcoming Master Plan of the MSP should be widely discussed with all stakeholders and 
endorsed by the EU and MPCs to become a cornerstone of the EuroMed energy cooperation within the 
EU energy external policy.43 On the implementation and institutional side, the MSP should clearly 
articulate responsibilities, in particular, between the UfM Secretariat, EC (headquarters and EU 
Delegations), ENPI projects, especially the Paving the Way for the MSP EuropeAid project, MPC 
governments and regional centres such as the Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency (RCREEE44), the regional focal reference for EE&RE deployment. In addition, interactions 
with industry/investors (DESERTEC, Medgrid) and civil society would help to enhance the regional 
ownership of the initiative. 
The need for integrated regional financing 
Undoubtedly, the implementation of the envisaged investment projects within the MSP, DESERTEC 
and Medgrid, once regulatory and market conditions are met, will also heavily depend on the 
financing.  
                                                     
42 See (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/medstat/introduction/). 
43 See (http://eeas.europa.eu/energy/index_en.htm). 
44 The Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (RCREEE) gathers nine South Arab 
countries plus Libya and Yemen; (www.rcreee.org) and was established in 2008 in Cairo at the initiative of the 
Danish and German cooperation agencies, and then with EC support. Staffed by a joint EU and MED expert 
team, RCREEE has developed a broad and strategic set of activities on EE&RE policy deployment in 
coordination with ENPI South energy projects (MED-EMIP, MEDENEC and PWMSP). 
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• Up to now, the financing of RE investments in MPCs by private banks (EU and PC) has 
remained limited (e.g. Tunisia’s solar water-heater PROSOL programme45. International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs) provide most of the financing. Since May 2011, the EBRD has 
extended its coverage to North Africa with high ambitions (a potential annual investment of 
€2.5 billion)46. The World Bank with the Clean Technological Fund (CTF) is also engaged in 
the region mostly in financing of RE. However, the EU remains the largest contributor, through 
various channels47: 
o The European Investment Bank (EIB): its loans, which target large projects (minimum of 
€20/25 million), are provided through a specific tool of the Facility for Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP48), credit lines to local banks and 
project investors (Special FEMIP Envelope). Out of a total of almost €10 billion of 
FEMIP loans for the period 2002-2009, the energy sector accounted for 37%, of which 
only €130 million (1.3%) for renewable energy; 
o InfraMed Infrastructure:49 the first financing facility of the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM). The InfraMed Fund is dedicated to investments in infrastructure in the SEMCs 
with initial commitments of €385 million to be raised to €1 billion (energy is expected to 
be a priority sector); 
o EU member states’ bilateral financing: several national development agencies such as the 
German Development Bank (KfW) and the French Development Agency (AFD) provide 
grants and concessional loans to specific projects (e.g. German and Spanish loans to wind 
farms in Egypt);  
o The Mediterranean Carbon Fund (MCF): CDC Climat, AFD, PROPARCO, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), CDP and KfW plan to launch in 2011 the MCF, which will 
purchase carbon emission reduction credits with initial commitments of €200 million. 
Overall, the EU’s existing financing scheme for EE&RE in the region is diverse but it appears rather 
fragmented (e.g. between EIB’s FEMIP and EC’s NIF), not sufficiently energy-specific, and mostly 
designed for large projects (e.g. EIB: only over €20/25 million), thus excluding a vast potential of 
small and medium projects, notably developed by SMEs.  
The EU plans to increase the total envelope of EIB loans for the region to €6 billion between 2011 and 
2013 (2010: €2.6 billion). This scale of effort provides a real opportunity to establish a dedicated joint 
regional development bank (possibly named “EuroMed Bank”, an EIB extension and following the 
EBRD model). It would need close coordination with other financial regional and bilateral initiatives 
such as the InfraMed Infrastructure. Also, a specific SEMCs’ bank would need to design an integrated 
financing scheme, both for large and small sustainable projects (e.g. EE&RE revolving funds) based 
on overall costs-benefits analysis. 
                                                     
45 www.unep.org/climatechange/finance/LoanProgrammes/MEDREP/PROSOLinTunisia/tabid/29559/ 
Default.aspx. 
46As decided by the EBRD Annual Meeting in Kazakhstan on 20-21 May 2011: 
(www.ebrd.com/pages/news/press/2011/110527.shtml. Current EBRD investments in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia stand at around €9 billion per year). 
47 Also the GEEREF (Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund) focuses on equity investment in 
EE&RE projects but does not cover the Mediterranean region yet.  
48 See (www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/index.htm?lang=en). 
49 Created in 2010 by Caisse des Dépôts (CDC-France), Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP-Italy), the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG-Morocco) and EFG Hermes (Egypt). 
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Annexes 
Annex 1.SEMCs household electricity prices (2008)  
 
Figure A1. Average electricity tariffs for households in 2008 
 
 
Figure A2. Average monthly electricity household bill (in kWh/month) (MEDENER/ADEME, 2012)  
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Annex 2. Energy subsidies in southern and eastern Mediterranean 
countries (SEMCs) 
 
Table A1. Food and fuel subsidies in SEMCs as a % of government expenditure 
 
Source: “Food and Energy Prices, Government Subsidies and Fiscal Balances in South Mediterranean 
Countries”, ECOFIN paper (Ronald Albers and Marga Peeters; January 2011) 
 
 
Table A2. IEA Estimates of Energy Subsidies in selected energy exporting Arab Countries, 2010 
 
Source: Fattouh B, 2012. 
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Annex 3. List of abbreviations 
BBL barrel (of crude oil) 
CSP concentrating solar power 
EE&RE energy efficiency and renewable energy 
EDI Energy Development Index 
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EIB European Investment Bank 
FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership 
GDP gross domestic product 
GHG greenhouse gas 
LPG liquefied petroleum gas 
IEA International Energy Agency (OECD) 
IFIs International Financial Institutions 
IT information technology 
MSP Mediterranean Solar Plan 
NIF Neighbourhood Investment Facility 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MPC Mediterranean Partner Countries 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPT Occupied Palestinian Territory 
PPP Purchasing power parity 
UfM Union for the Mediterranean 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
RCREEE Regional Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency 
SEMCs southern and eastern Mediterranean countries50 
SWH Solar water heater 
toe ton of oil equivalent  
VAT Value-added tax 
                                                     
50 Algeria, Morocco,Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, OPT, Syria, Turkey. 
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